The impact of democratization on foreign policy the rise and fall of the Turkish-Israeli alliance by Erpul, Onur
  
THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION ON FOREIGN POLICY 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
ONUR ERPUL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of International Relations 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
Ankara 
 
 
 
September 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my grandfather 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION ON FOREIGN POLICY 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
ONUR ERPUL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
in 
 
 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
September 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
.................................... 
(Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı) 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
.................................... 
(Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan) 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. 
 
 
 
.................................... 
(Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı) 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
.................................... 
(Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel) 
Director 
 
  
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATIZATION ON FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
Erpul, Onur 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
September 2012 
 
 
 
Globalization is affecting state behavior in different ways. The purpose of 
this study is to understand the ways in which changes in the domestic structures of 
torn states due to democratization and decentralization and how these affect alliance 
behavior. By analyzing the Turkish-Israeli alliance through a longitudinal 
comparative case study comparing system level and state level variables in the 
1990s and in the AKP period, the research argues that democratization, which 
empowers new elites and enables them to articulate and pursue alternative national 
agendas, leads to unpredictable alliance behavior. The findings suggest that purely 
systemic theories are not sufficient to address alliances in the contemporary world. 
Furthermore, the findings also suggest that globalization may be aggravating 
international anarchy. 
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ÖZET 
 
DEMOKRATİKLEŞMENİN DIŞ POLİTİKA ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİLERİ: 
TÜRK-İSRAİL İTTİFAKININ YÜKSELİŞİ VE ÇÖKÜŞÜ 
Erpul, Onur 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
Eylül 2012 
 
 
 
Küreselleşme devletlerin davranışlarını çeşitli şekillerde etkilemektedir. Bu 
tezin amacı demokratikleşme nedeniyle iç yapılarında ortaya çıkan değişikliklerin 
gelişmekte olan devletlerin dış politikalarını nasıl etkilediklerini 
anlamaktır.1990larda ve AK Parti yönetimi sırasında sistem düzeyi ve devlet düzeyi 
değişkenler ele alınarak Türk-Israil ilişkilerini dikey karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi 
yapan bu tez, şu sonucu gösterir: Demokratikleşme, yeni elitlerin iktidara gelmesini 
ve bu şekilde ulusal çıkarın yeniden yapılanmasını mümkün kılar, bu nedenle de 
ittifaklık ilişkilerinin dengesizleşmesini sağlar. Sistem düzeyini temel alan teorilerin 
devletlerin davranışlarını açıklmakata yeterli olmadığını göstermenin yanında, bu 
bulglar ayrıca küreselleşmenin uluslararası anarşiyi kışkırtabileceğini de ortaya 
koymaktadır. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
1. 1. Introduction 
Politics make for strange bedfellows, as the saying goes. No truer is this than for 
international relations where we have witnessed the unlikeliest partners joining in 
the pursuit of achieving common ends. History is rife with such examples. For 
example, the Franco-Ottoman alliance of the 16th century is an example of how two 
dominant powers joined forces to thwart the emergence of the Habsburg Empire. 
Centuries later, the British and French Empires vied for supremacy around the world 
and fought numerous hegemonic wars. Yet, these same two countries became 
partners against a revisionist Germany during the 20
th
 century. Likewise, it was 
possible for various competing national identities and claims to form the Balkan 
Coalition against a moribund Ottoman Empire in the prelude to the First World War; 
and it was these very claims that led the Coalition to turn on itself. Some alliances 
have also proved very durable. For example, the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, signed 
in 1373, is perhaps the oldest alliance treaty still in effect (Kierman, 1973). In short, 
these snapshots from history suggest that the phenomenon of alliances is a salient 
feature of international politics - alliances are a timeless and relevant topic of 
inquiry. 
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Yet, while alliances will continue to be a feature of global politics, the 
nature, the causes, of such arrangements are likely to change with global 
developments. For example, regime type affected the alignment behavior of Greek 
city-states (Bachteller, 1997: 317); dynastic bonds affected alliances in the Middle 
Ages; concerns about the balance of power determined the alliance behavior of 19th 
century great powers; and alliances of the second half of the 20th century were 
affected by the logic of the bipolar international system. One can legitimately ask if 
our understanding of alliances corresponds to the political realities of today. What 
can be said of contemporary times?  
Despite its critics (Keohane & Nye, 2000: 118) globalization appears to be a 
striking feature of the international system since the end of the Cold War. Although 
no commonly accepted definition exists, globalization is said to encompass the  
rapidly increasing interdependence between nations, greater interconnectedness 
between peoples as a result of technological progress, greater amounts of 
interactions between individuals and institutions around the world, and an 
increasingly convoluted world in which the frontiers of international and domestic  
issues have eroded (McGrew, 2003: 22-23). The concept of increasing economic 
interdependence and interactions between nations is hardly a new one. One can point 
to the trans-Mediterranean trade in antiquity (Miles, 2010) and, later, the rise of 
seafaring empires in Europe as historical examples of globalization. Given the scale 
of the imperial projects of the great powers in the Edwardian period, perhaps the 
early 20th century was even more globalized than today (McGrew, 2003: 26).  
  
 
3 
 
 The end of the Cold War bipolar world and concomitant developments in 
technology and logistics, increasing levels of transnational activity and the 
accompanying transformation of the social and political landscape have raised 
uncertainties about the international system. Globalization and accompanying 
processes are reducing the ability of states to fulfill their traditional functions. As a 
myriad of transnational forces infiltrate the state and begin to take over its functions 
at various levels, the state begins to lose its effectiveness (Cerny, 1998). Diffuse 
interests, diverse groups and transnational pressures have deemphasized concerns 
over interstate security. In fact, these pressures are weakening the state by 
empowering different groups, resulting in insecurity from within caused by civil 
wars, religious conflicts and terrorism. As it was the case in medieval times, one 
may be able to, in the future, speak of multiple competing local and transnational 
institutions, a multitude of conflicts, emergence of fragmented identities, and an 
increase in (subversive) activities for individuals who can exit from political society 
(Cerny, 1998: 57).  But stronger states with established democratic institutions are 
better able to accommodate these decentralizing forces.  
In the developing world, the challenges of globalization are felt more acutely 
by states that were not particularly adept at fulfilling the tasks traditionally ascribed 
to them. For such states, the decentralizing and liberalizing effects of globalization 
lead to the empowerment of new elites, precipitating a conflict between society and 
the old order (Cerny, 2009: 771). The emphasis on elites is very important because 
"modern states as we know them are the product of elites seeking to entrench their 
political dominance and to expand their resources and wealth while co-opting 
subaltern groups into supporting their power" (Cerny, 2009: 771-772).  
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The emergence of new elites and powerful societal actors impinges on the 
autonomy of the old elites in foreign policy making. In countries with weak power 
structures and fragmented societies, the state apparatus, as represented by the old 
elite, will attempt to retain a semblance of coherence by centralizing power through 
securitization, often with little success. Torn states are states with sufficient coercive 
capabilities, but are often lacking in a developed civil society. These states have to 
manage the waves as they oscillate back and forth between securitzation and 
centralization, and liberalization and decentralization (Aydınlı, 2005). These states 
are centralized and powerful enough to muster sufficient consent from a relatively 
weak society. However, this type of state feels insecure as the accompanying forces 
of globalization, democratization and liberalization empower society which seeks to 
exercise a more influential role in decision-making (106, 110) The state and 
traditional elite may feel compelled to adopt a new power-sharing agreement with 
emerging elites and society (democratization) to counter the challenges of a 
globalizing, multicentric, world. Yet, these elements may also potentially upset the 
efficacy and security of the state, leading traditional elites to engage in securitization 
to balance internal threats. Their job is thus managing globalizing processes such as 
democratization, and balancing centralization (securitization) and desecuritization 
(Aydınlı, 2005:111). 
We find evidence for both. The pressures of globalization and 
democratization are compelling states to react in different ways. For example, China 
and Russia, despite some democratization, are now undertaking more centralizing 
policies (Cerny, 2008). Their foreign policies are often at odds with rest of the world 
as we have seen with Iran and Syria recently. On the other hand, many countries of 
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the Former Soviet Union have made a transition to democracy and some have 
become members of the European Union, and even NATO. Since early 2011, the 
Arab Spring has crashed on to the international scene affecting Tunisia, Libya, 
Egypt, Syria and Yemen. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are in limbo; their authoritarian 
leaders have been ousted but new democratic regimes are yet to be established. 
Syrian leader Assad is currently fighting a civil war to protect his unraveling regime. 
In all of these cases, popular uprisings were instigated mainly by popular 
demonstrations, many of which assembled in mere hours thanks to the medium of 
internet-based social networks such as Facebook. The demonstrations and ensuing 
debates featured civil society actors advocating a wide variety of interests. Whether 
it is sectarian concerns or a desire for genuinely secular democratic governance, the 
domestic power sharing agreements of these states and their foreign policy 
disposition will likely occupy the agenda for some time. The main point is that we 
do not know how any of this will end.  
In the meantime, there are still many weak states with authoritarian regimes 
and it is just as difficult to tell how globalization and democratization are going to 
affect them. One need only to remember the meteoric rise of democracies in the past 
several decades (Fukuyama, 2011:3).The point is that democratization is indeed the 
most salient feature of international politics today and the emergence of new elites 
and greater participation of society in economic and political life in developing 
countries will indubitably leave a mark on the unfolding of international politics.  
If old elites had a particular foreign policy disposition, will new elites 
necessarily share their convictions?  Returning to the original issue of alliances, will 
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new elites and societal forces in democratizing countries want to maintain the 
international commitments of their old discredited elite?   For example, the new 
elites of the Republic of Korea are not keen on cooperating with their allies in US. 
The once robust Turkish-Israeli alliance has run its course and the two countries 
have abruptly severed their diplomatic relations after a series of diplomatic crises 
culminating in the Gaza Flotilla Incident in 2010 - all of this was no doubt 
aggravated by the changing domestic calculations in Turkey. It is thus clear that any 
attempts to explain alliance behavior in the modern world, or foreign policy for that 
matter, necessitates an understanding of democratization. To put it simply, how does 
democratization affect alliance behavior? The following literature review of 
alliances and democratization will see if current research is well suited to address the 
challenges of a democratizing world and whether or not a revision is in order. Is the 
current tool-kit for analyzing alliances sufficient for the modern world?  
 
 
1. 2. Literature Review 
 
This section will review the scholarship relating to alliance behavior. This will 
necessitate an examination of both internal and external factors that contribute to 
alignment. Furthermore, the review will also identify works that link 
democratization with particular foreign policy behaviors. Alliance behavior and 
foreign policy behavior are distinct but understanding how various domestic factors 
and, more importantly, processes like democratization have affected foreign policy 
behavior can yield conclusions about the future of the international system. Some 
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approaches do not even distinguish between foreign policy and alliance behavior as 
both are essentially a form of balancing, as will be explored below. For the purpose 
of uniting this disparate literature, the review will be divided on the basis of a levels 
of analysis approach in which the enquiry is carried out through a separate analysis 
of variables emanating from the international system and from within the state 
(Waltz, 1959; Keohane et al, 1994).  
 
 
1. 2. 2 System Level Sources of Alliances 
 
Intuitively, alliances are simply a consequence of the mutual utility in combining 
capabilities to fend off external threats. The capability aggregation model of 
alliances is a scholarly expression of such thinking (Morgenthau & Thompson 
1985).  More nuanced versions of the argument also highlight the importance of the 
relative power between the partners of the alliance and suggest that alliances in 
which partners have asymmetric capabilities are more likely to form (Morrow, 
1991). Indeed, the relative distribution of capabilities between states, the balance of 
power, is at the crux of externally oriented theories like realism.  More importantly, 
these interactions of these different states have produced an anarchic international 
system in which there is no system wide authority to keep states in awe (Snyder 
1997: 4). This induces states to undertake actions necessary to perpetuate their 
existence in a ‘self-help’ system. In achieving this end, states must compete with 
one another in a ‘zero-sum game’ as gains by one state translate into a loss for 
another (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985; Waltz, 2003: 53).   
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The successful states of this system command more capabilities and have 
greater impact on international politics and the interactions of other states. This is 
why states tend to copy the best practices of the most powerful states - the 
socializing effect of anarchy (Taliaferro, 2006: 464-466). For example, Waltz 
postulated that the power constellations in an international system account for 
international outcomes. That is to say the number of great powers (i.e. polarity) in an 
international system can affect the interactions between states (Forde, 1995: 145). In 
explaining why hegemonic systems do not endure, Waltz argues that states 
"balance” against more powerful states (Waltz, 1979). It is essential to understand 
that balancing may refer to actions wherein states increase their own capabilities - 
internal balancing- or combine their capabilities with others' through alliances - 
external balancing (Waltz, 1979: 56). Waltz's approach is one that is geared towards 
explaining systemic outcomes and alliances are the tools states use to ensure a 
balance of power.  
As for alliances as a foreign policy outcome, Stephen Walt (1987: 33)  later 
put forward the notion of a ‘balance of threat,’ arguing that the presence of a 
dominant power in itself does not induce states to balance unless a state’s 
capabilities are considered a threat. This is determined by the proximity of the state, 
the offense-defense balance in military technology, and perceived offensive 
intentions. Unlike Waltz, Walt’s balancing proposition does not suggest an 
automatic balance of power, but balancing is a partly dyadic process in which states 
consciously strive to counteract each other’s policies (Vasquez & Elman, 2003: 14-
15). Walt (1987: 34) also proposes that states are more likely to balance against 
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threats, and that neither ideology nor economic tools play a significant role in 
determining alliances. 
The approaches above do not adequately account for cases in which states 
ally with aggressors even if no threat is present. Schweller (1994) in contrast to Walt 
and Waltz argues in favor of a balance of interests approach. Though less 
parsimonious than the previous approaches, Schweller is able to account for oddities 
in alignment behavior of states and show that states do not merely wish to preserve 
their sovereignty, or what they already possess, but may instead wish to make gains. 
This is exemplified by the fact that states often bandwagon (ally with the aggressor 
to share the spoils of war) because they wish to profit from the successes of a 
revisionist state (Schweller, 2006). 
Christensen and Snyder (1990) deepen the argument, suggesting that 
perceived advantages in  defense or offense and expected gains may affect a state’s 
decision to form coalitions against aggressors (chain-ganging) or to shirk from 
responsibilities and defect from alliance commitments (buck passing) if costs are too 
high. 
In the pursuit of explaining foreign policy outcomes, such as alliances, 
scholars began to refine structural realism with the addition of unit-level variables.  
For neoclassical realists (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al, 2009), who endeavor to 
understand maladaptive behavior (instances in which states behave contradictory to 
system level expectations), these unit level variables such as elite interests and 
domestic society are an additional set of constraints to state behavior (albeit one that 
is subordinate to external or system level variables). Neoclassical realists suggest an 
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imperfect transmission belt between the anarchic international system (independent 
variable), leaders and domestic variables (intervening variables) resulting in the 
dependent variable: balancing behavior (Schweller 2004: 164).  However, changes 
in the relative distribution of capabilities affect first and foremost the calculations of 
leaders; the emphasis on the system level is what makes the realist paradigm unique 
(Rathbun, 2008). 
The drawback of most realist approaches  is that keeping the independent 
variable at the system level (threats) draws attention away from matters such as elite 
driven securitization (or desecuritization).  Neoclassical realism has the potential to 
address this gap but in the new global environment there is reason to believe that 
domestic concerns take precedence over capabilities and that elites and emerging 
actors play a game of securitization-desecuritization. 
As it will be explored below, not all scholars view the state as a unitary actor 
that takes the international system as the primary basis for its actions. The next step 
is to cross the international-domestic threshold. 
 
 
1. 2. 3 Domestic Sources of Alliances 
 
In keeping with the levels of analysis approach, the next logical step is to scrutinize 
variables and processes that may affect alliance behavior. As such, the following 
sections will review works that link domestic factors such as domestic threats and 
regime types to alliance behavior or foreign policy. The same will be repeated for 
  
 
11 
 
processes such as regime change, or more specifically, the main trend in world 
affairs, democratization, and how it affects foreign policy and alliance behavior.   
 
 
2.3.1 Regimes and Alliances 
 
To what extent do domestic factors such as regime type affect the behavior of states?  
Regime change could be considered an important precipitator of alliance 
reconfigurations. Morrow (1991) tests several propositions regarding alliance 
behavior among symmetric and asymmetric alliances. He argues that three factors, 
such as the deterioration of security and autonomy within an alliance, opportunities 
to attain security elsewhere, and a change in a state’s “utility function” can affect 
decisions to break alliances. 
Siverson and Starr (1994: 145) have taken this basic template to argue that 
changes in political regimes can have implications for the utility of alliances. That 
is, states with new regimes will have different interests, different expectations, and 
may therefore “evidence greater propensities toward realigning their alliance 
portfolios” (Siverson & Starr, 1994: 148). Leadership changes that occur naturally 
within a political system may not lead to any discernable changes in policy. 
However, there are regime changes that result in a modification of internal political 
structures. Siverson and Starr distinguish three distinct types of changes: one in 
which an externally imposed (by an enemy) regime collapse; a regime collapse due 
to internal violence; and one in which severe political crises lead to change. They 
conclude that although “power statuses” influence alignment behavior, internal 
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political changes can have a profound impact on alliance behavior and foreign 
policies independent of power concerns (Siverson & Starr, 1994: 158). 
Some also emphasize the importance of similarity of regime type - that alike 
states, especially democratic ones, tend to align with each other (Lai & Reiter, 2000: 
203). This is the point in which we enter the democratic peace literature. 
 
 
2.3.2. The Democratic Peace 
 
One of the most well established notions in international relations regarding the 
impact of domestic variables on international relations is the democratic peace, 
which is based on the idea of “perpetual peace” put forward by Kant (Levy, 1988: 
602). Implicit in this idea is that globalization and democratization will eventually 
increase the number of republican democracies in the world, to the effect that 
international wars will be reduced (Russet, 1993). The republican democracies exert 
a pacifying influence because it would guarantee freedom of individuals, legal 
equality, dependence on common formal institutions that would uphold the rule of 
law (Kant, 2003: 490). 
Modern theorists propose a link between institutional constraints and 
peaceful foreign policy, while others emphasize the importance of norms and 
democratic culture in explaining civil relations between democracies (Layne, 1994: 
13-14). Of the former, one example is a game theoretical test of institutional 
constraints on decision-making in an autocratic and a democratic country (Mesquita 
et al, 1999). The argument is that incumbent leaders in autocracies need only a few 
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key supporters and are able to retain their power at home regardless of the 
consequences of war. In contrast, democratic leaders can easily be removed from 
office via elections and therefore they will only engage in war if it will not result in 
the incumbents’ removal from office. The implication is that democracies only fight 
wars when they are certain of victory and when war is a reality leaders will mobilize 
all possible resources, take all measures necessary, to win the war and retain their 
political careers. In short, democratic countries are not only more selective in 
targets, but leaders’ disposition towards dedicating more resources to the war effort 
make them unattractive targets for other countries (Mesquita et al., 1999: 803). 
Some, like Christopher Layne, are critical of the democratic peace. Layne 
recognizes that there is indeed a correlation between domestic democracy and 
peaceful foreign policy towards other democracies; but because wars and 
democracies are rare in the international system, the findings of the theory are not 
significant (Layne, 1994). Using process tracing and case study method, Layne 
provides several examples of near-misses in which democratic countries nearly 
fought one another. For him, the international system and security concerns shape 
the very nature of democracy within countries and how these countries pursue their 
foreign policies. Moreover, the proposition that democracies tend not to go to war 
with on another but are willing to go to war against non-democracies shows that 
democracies are not necessarily more pacific than other regimes (Layne, 1994: 12). 
Democratic peace has its merits but it has little bearing on the political 
realities of the democratizing globe. Even if we are to accept the premise that in the 
end, when every country becomes a republican democracy peace will prevail, the 
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transition process, as the authors below argue, is more than rocky. Furthermore, 
even where democratic institutions are well developed, leaders are still affected by 
democratic necessities. This is because political competition is a sine qua non of 
democracies and leaders have to adhere to the demands of the public and interest 
groups in order to win elections and stay in power. They may even have to 
manipulate the agenda and display bombastic rhetoric and nationalism if need be 
(Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2004: 776). 
 
 
2.3.3 Domestic Threats and Alliances 
 
As domestic variables begin to enter the analysis, we are presented a deeper but 
more complex picture of international relations. David (1991) introduces the idea of 
omnibalancing to account for the deficiencies of balance of power explanations in 
accounting for the alignment decisions of third world countries. His main premise is 
that leaders in many developing countries need to address all internal security 
problems in addition to external threats (David, 1991: 233). Such states may ally 
with one hostile coalition to balance another hostile threat. Furthermore, a leader 
may opt for an alliance that would buttress its own domestic position and counteract 
threats to the regime. Similar to David (1991), Barnett and Levy (1991) also tackle 
the problem of alliance patterns in developing countries. Threats are not limited to 
outside the state but there are threats emanating from within the state. States may opt 
to ally themselves or to undertake internal balancing by mobilizing resources. 
However, both strategies have drawbacks as it may lead to a loss of political 
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independence or inability of a state to cope economically with the strain of a 
mobilized expensive military.  
 
 
1. 2. 4 Processes 
 
1. 2. 4. 1 Democratization, Elites and Consequences  
 
The following works suggest that democratizing authoritarian countries or mixed 
systems tend to produce suboptimal foreign policies. Many of these works 
emphasize the salience of elites, militaries, and interest groups and how, in pursuit 
of their interests, they mobilize domestic support for their causes by using a 
particular ideology or set of behaviors. The purpose of including foreign policy as a 
dependent variable is to show how scholars have treated the effects of 
democratization on international relations. The way states behave in this context 
could also explain why new alliances may emerge or old stable ones break-down 
Jack Snyder seeks to understand why great powers tend to produce self-
defeating expansionistic foreign policies but provides an answer as to how 
democratization can impact foreign policy.  Despite working within the realist 
paradigm, Snyder (1993: 20) cautions readers against the system level bias of 
neorealism and seeks the answer in the realm of domestic politics, arguing that as far 
as large states are concerned “domestic pressures often outweigh international ones 
in the calculations of national leaders.” Decision-making elites generally pursue 
more moderate foreign policies because they often have little incentive to pursue 
policies to the contrary. On the other hand, there are certain groups within states that 
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have parochial interests that benefit from imperial expansion, yet these groups 
cannot affect state policy per se. Snyder argues that over time these groups tend to 
form coalitions, or cartels, and become significant groups within the state. They 
utilize their specialized knowledge (especially in societies with weak democratic 
institutions) to rally masses in support of their “imperial myths” – that expansions 
and imperialism will somehow benefit the state. Decision-making elites, either by 
close association to these groups or through their own beliefs may end up believing 
in these myths. Thus, the decision-making elites and the cartels may unite and, in the 
absence of sufficient counterweights, use their privileged positions to sell these 
myths to the masses. The author finds that early industrialized countries with strong 
democratic institutions with traditions of open debate tend to pursue moderate 
foreign policies. Later industrialized, and democratizing, countries like Germany 
pursued aggressive, autarkic, policies because it benefitted powerful groups such as 
the Ruhr steel industries and Junker agriculturalists as well as the Imperial Navy. 
Most relevant to this review is that although democracies restrain such tendencies, 
they are by no means completely immune to cartel politics because through 
information monopolies or democratic cleavages, the mythmakers may end up 
prisoners of their own rhetoric. That is, if strong cartels operate within a weak 
democratic system and truncated debate “increasing mass participation will 
exacerbate the cartel’s tendency toward overexpansion, because selling strategic 
ideology to the masses will probably produce blowback effects that constrain the 
elite mythmakers themselves” (Snyder 1993: 310). Snyder illustrates how the 
emergence of non-state actors as influential state actors adversely affect the 
international behavior of states.  
  
 
17 
 
Another work by Snyder (2000: 34-37) details the perils of democratization, 
arguing that a premature transition to democratic participation can result in 
nationalist conflicts. Snyder dismisses the “popular rivalries and ancient hatreds” 
type arguments that suggest that nationalism precedes democratization. Instead, he 
argues that democratization potentially harms the interests of entrenched elites, who 
attempt to latch onto their traditional influence by attempting to exclude rival groups 
within the state through nationalist-elite persuasion. Snyder has conceived of four 
categories of nationalism based on the strength of a state’s political institutions and 
the preferences and adaptability of elites. Basing his research on four case studies, 
Snyder (80-81) argues that democratization in countries with strong institutions 
where elites are willing to concede power tend to produce a civic nationalism that 
produces more cost-conscious foreign policies. In contrast, countries lacking in one 
or both of these features tend to produce types of nationalism that are more 
aggressive in their foreign policies. For example, the elites of revolutionary France 
tried to restore institutional order in the country by rallying the people behind an 
aggressive, revolutionary, foreign policy that aimed to promote unity at home by 
spreading the revolution abroad (in this case, culminating in the Revolutionary 
Wars). The intractable Junker elite of Wilhelmine Germany advocated a 
counterrevolutionary military nationalism that justified their preeminence in German 
society at the exclusion of socialists and liberals, whereas Serbs, lacking in both 
institutions and adaptable elites followed an exclusionary ethnic nationalism.  
Another example of studies linking democracy and conflict (and one which 
has inspired many of the aforementioned works) is Mansfield and Snyder (1995: 7-
8) who set out with the idea that while desirable, democratization is a painful 
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process and transitional countries are likely to become embroiled in wars than 
mature democracies or stable autocracies. The reason for this is mainly to be found 
in elites as elites of the old regime find themselves in competition with new elites. In 
order to retain the reins of power, the old elites adopt an increasingly militaristic and 
nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize public support, with the effect that these nationalist 
“prestige strategies” can result in unmanageable political coalitions or an unwieldy 
public. In any case, the more elites attempt to gain prestige and populist legitimacy 
the more they are likely to reach political impasses. Using Correlates of War and 
Polity II data, Mansfield and Snyder suggest that countries in transition to 
democracy, particularly in the short-term, are more likely to participate in wars than 
other types of governments.  
Cederman, Hug and Wenger (2008) explore the proposition that 
democratization is conducive to war. They say that empirical data from the case 
studies generated by other IR scholars suggest that transition to democracy leads to 
conflict (interstate and intrastate). The argument goes that democratization opens 
more opportunities for previously neglected groups to seek political power. 
However, state elites wish to maintain the status quo but democracy increasingly 
constrains the ability of states to conduct wars and seek a panacea to internal 
problems abroad. The result is that state elites begin to use internal scapegoats to 
rally public support behind them, resulting in civil war (Cederman et al, 2008: 518). 
Civil war, the authors argue, tends to transform into interstate war as was the case, 
for example, during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, according to 
Gleditsch’s (2004: 519-529) article, which utilizes a spatio-temporal macro analysis 
of democratizing regions, democracy, on balance, reduces risks of interstate conflict.  
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Additionally, some scholars have asked how democratization within specific 
countries or regions affects their foreign policies. For example, Malcolm and Prada 
(1996) evaluate Mansfield and Snyder in the context of Russian democratization 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their conclusion is that while the practical 
need for leaders to retain power at home and enhance his supporter base in an era of 
growing political fragmentation has led Yeltsin’s Russia to adopt a more assertive, 
less cooperative, foreign policy towards the West (Malcolm & Prada, 1996: 551). 
On the other hand, democratic institutions and free press have mitigated crises and 
the latter, by drawing attention to the negative aspects of using force against 
Chechens, has made both internal and, therefore, external use of force a less likely 
policy option.     
Similar to Mansfield and Snyder, Adamson (2001: 288) also utilizes 
democratization as an independent variable and seeks to explain Turkey’s foreign 
policy in 1974 vis-à-vis Cyprus. She evaluates the propositions of democratic peace 
as well as democratization and war, and is critical of the scholars of the former for 
simplifying regime types and regime elements into binaries. Upon examination, she 
argues that democratization has hindered Turkish foreign policy. The 1973 election 
in Turkey produced an unstable coalition government featuring two vastly different 
parties and leaders. When this government encountered the crisis in Cyprus, it was 
forced both by the other political parties as well as vociferous public opinion to 
favor a military intervention over diplomacy (288). The result was that in order to 
maintain the coalition government and any semblance of stability, in a country 
suffering from a polarized and radicalized population, Turkey intervened in Cyprus 
(299). It must be said that domestic opinion reduced in both Greece (which was also 
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undergoing democratization at the time) and Turkey the ability of the leaders to 
negotiate. In the end, although a myriad of domestic forces had hindered Turkey’s 
ability to pursue a more diplomatic foreign policy, the author argues that 
democratization by itself does not lead to conflict, but that the specific domestic and 
international contexts combine to produce foreign policy outcomes (302). 
 
 
2.4.2 Democratization and Institutions 
 
Some scholars have also highlighted the importance of international institutions. If 
democratization occurs in a better developed institutional framework, then 
democracy is more likely to root and hostile behavior may be averted.  For example, 
in a follow-up to their earlier studies, Mansfield and Snyder (2002a: 298) provide an 
updated research design where they argue that transitions to democracy are 
conducive to war if institutions that regulate political participation are weak. In such 
nascent systems, they argue, nationalism is necessary to mobilize a disunited, 
heterogeneous, society. As in their previous article, Mansfield and Snyder write that 
elites, old and new, may also feel it necessary to manipulate nationalist sentiments in 
order to rally the public in support of their parochial interest, which may lead to 
aggressive foreign policies (2002a: 303-304). Their research divides democratization 
into two phases: from autocracy to a mixed system, and from there to a consolidated 
democracy. The latter is particularly relevant to the “torn states” in the introduction. 
In such states, the basics of a working democracy are well-established but inter-elite 
struggles may create incentives for elites to “play the nationalist card in public 
debates or gamble for resurrection in a foreign crisis” (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002a: 
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305). In such a domestic environment, the military may wish to reestablish itself as 
the dominant force in politics by appearing to rule on behalf of the popular will. In 
turn civilian elites, to protect their political influence both from the military and 
from each other, may try to show that they are in firm control of security issues. The 
ensuing populist nationalist rivalry may result in conflictive relations, even war, 
with neighboring states. The authors exemplify this point with a case study of 
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974.  
Clare (2007: 264) also analyzes democratization and conflict. Like Mansfield 
and Snyder he distinguishes between first-time democratizing states and states 
caught in between (re-democratizers), arguing that in both cases old authoritarian 
legacies and the level of institutional development affect the foreign policies of 
democratizing leaders. First-time democratizing leaders have to operate within a 
weaker institutional environment in which old elites (military bureaucracies and 
similar groups) may attempt to retake power if the governing democratizers perform 
poorly in their foreign policy. Thus, these leaders exercise cautious foreign policies. 
Re-democratizing states, on the other hand, have a previous legacy of democracy 
and institutional development. In such circumstances, the political leaders are less 
vulnerable (but not completely) to the old authoritarian elite but are more concerned 
with political rivals and electoral outcomes (Clare, 2007: 265). The strong 
institutional environment insulates leaders from the old elites and instead they can 
exhibit assertive foreign policies, i.e. initiate disputes, to win electoral support.    
Mansfield and Snyder (2002b: 530) have also vindicated their propositions in 
the form of dyads to better contribute (as in providing more caveats) to the dyadic 
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democratic peace proposition. Narang and Nelson (2009) dispute Mansfield and 
Snyder’s claims (1995; 2002a; 2002b) by scrutinizing their findings. They argue that 
not only are Mansfield and Snyder’s claims insignificant when regime type is 
subtracted from their equation, but their entire argument is kept alive by several 
outlier cases, especially on the quick succession of wars initiated by the Balkan 
states against the Ottoman Empire in the early 20
th
 century. Instead, democratizing 
states with weak institutions are far more likely to “implode.” The spillover effects 
from these failed states may of course lead to international war and other problems 
(Narang, Nelson, 2009: 376). 
 
 
2.4.3 Democratization and Alliances 
 
Scholarly work that focuses on the impact of democratization on alliance behavior is 
limited. According to Lee (2007a) democratization has led to different alliance 
outcomes. Whereas Taiwan has developed a more intimate relationship with US, the 
Philippines has distanced itself from US. Lee believes that the type of 
democratization and the presence of security threats are responsible for the vastly 
different outcomes. The presence of a security threat will naturally make an alliance 
more valuable. Transformations in which the old elite precipitate democratization 
allows for a gradual transformation of the elite in which emerging elites are, to some 
extent, socialized into a democratic environment and thus acquire some of the 
pragmatism of their predecessors (Lee, 2007a: 149-150). In contrast, abrupt regime 
changes triggered by democratic elites will prevent the new elite from being inured 
with “strategic realities” (Lee, 2007a: 150). Thus, different levels of security threats, 
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when combined with a type of democratic transition may account for variations in 
alliance outcomes.  
Lee’s (2007b:) explanation of the declining relationship between the 
Republic of Korea (hereafter, ‘ROK’) and the US is also relevant to our concerns. 
Unlike the other works here, Lee is interested in explaining a gradual weakening of 
an alliance, not the emergence of a civil war or international conflict as a result of 
democratization (Lee, 2007b: 471). Democratization has had an adverse effect on 
the alliance between the two countries because it has empowered new democratic 
and nationalist elites that believe in national sovereignty and feel that a foreign 
military presence with strong ties to the old authoritarian elite undermines the 
principles of democracy. Furthermore, nationalist rhetoric is employed for the 
purpose of discrediting the old elite ((Lee, 2007b : 472) and used for electoral gain 
(Lee, 2007b: 477). Increasing nationalism also led to a desecuritization of ROK’s 
perception of North Korea, which the new elites began to view as a viable partner 
rather than threat (481). Uncooperative attitudes from ROK and public attitudes 
combined to gradually weaken, but not sever the alliance. However, the nature of 
ROK’s democratic transition and the relative capabilities of the North have 
mitigated the impact on US-ROK relations.  
Lee’s overall framework and reasoning have a few limitations though. 
Firstly, it has little to say about the military and its role in society and foreign policy. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘old elites’ need to be analyzed at greater depth because 
they cooperate with, if not constitute, the military and bureaucracy. It is the military 
and bureaucracy that defines national interest and what is at stake in foreign 
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interactions and alliance commitments. One may also ask how democratization can 
affect bilateral relations, or alliances, in dyads featuring states that are more evenly 
balanced in their capabilities. 
 
 
1. 3. Conclusion 
 
Revisiting the turbulent world we live in, traditional alliance theories that are based 
on capabilities, mutual utility, or threats are not sufficient to address the current 
global system. Today domestic political concerns of old elites in guarding their 
autonomy and the increasingly bolder attacks by the emerging elites and civil 
society on that autonomy have led to a game of securitization-desecuritization. In 
this context of democratization, the domestic play of power has perhaps taken a 
precedence over actual systemic factors.    
This is the point in which I will endeavor to make a contribution. I argue that 
democratization is reducing the consistency of state behavior, including states’ 
commitment to alliances. Thus: democratization inconsistent state behavior. 
Moreover, in this international conjuncture, increased levels of democracy will not 
contribute to regional/international peace and stability as democratic peace theorists 
predict. Instead, an increase in unpredictable state behavior, as a result of 
democratization, amounts to an increase in international anarchy. It is an ironic twist 
that a liberal concept is aggravating the core tenet of the realist paradigm. The 
research design will be laid out in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
2. 1. The Limits of Alliance Theories 
 
It comes as no surprise that theorizing on alliance behavior has taken place mainly 
within the realist paradigm which identifies the nation state as the primary actor in 
international relations.  Forging alliances is one of the major ways in which states 
are able to mitigate the effects of anarchy – that is, balancing against threatening 
states. The other option is to increase the efficacy by which the state, as a 
multifunctional administrative apparatus, is able to extract resources from its 
population and mobilize them towards realizing national objectives. In this 
endeavor, states are receptive to new ideas; they will copy the practices of more 
powerful states. The story of developing states in modern history is a testament to 
the socializing effects of anarchy (Waltz, 2010).  In the past several centuries, we 
witnessed the creation of centralized bureaucracies, inflated military budgets, 
populist rallies, the rise and fall of imperial ventures, and the enactment of large-
scale modernization projects in the developing world. Alliance building is the 
external, while state-building is an internal, manifestation of a set of policies that 
ultimately serve to perpetuate the sovereign independence of a state.  
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However anarchy is not the only factor affecting states. The previous chapter 
identified globalization as an important structural force. It is something that compels 
states to democratize their political system and to decentralize their administrative 
powers. These pressures for democratization and decentralization of state power 
have called into question the role of the state, and in this respect opinions vary. 
Some argue the state will adapt to these changes and continue being the primary 
global actor, while others believe states cannot maintain control. A reason for this 
controversy may lie in the fact that some states are more adaptable to such changes. 
Developed countries, which others aspire to emulate, have more or less 
adapted to many of these processes. Institutional maturity and social cohesion mean 
that such states can afford to concede power to civilian actors and can afford to 
deemphasize threats. However, this is not the case in countries with weak power 
structures and fragmented societies. This type of state feels compelled to secure 
itself by centralizing power and mobilizing society through securitization. “Weak 
states” do not possess such institutional maturity and the state has to undertake often 
coercive policies in order to pursue national goals (Aydınlı, 2005). There exists 
another category of states between these two. “Torn states” already posses 
centralized power and relatively developed societal cohesion but they face the 
dilemma of liberalizing and securitizing. They cannot ignore the imperative to 
democratize, decentralize, liberalize; nor can they resist the urge to insulate 
themselves from perceived threats to their regimes that may arise from letting go of 
power. This type of state feels insecure as the accompanying forces of globalization, 
democratization and liberalization empower society which seeks to exercise a more 
influential role in decision-making (Aydınlı, 2005: 106, 110). The traditional state 
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needs to foster this trend in order to respond to the necessities of a globalizing 
world. Yet, these elements may also potentially upset the efficacy and security of the 
state, leading traditional elites to engage in securitization to balance internal threats 
– their job is thus to manage globalizing processes such as democratization and by 
balancing centralization (securitization) and desecuritization. But this leads to a 
conflictive reconfiguration of power between old elites and security actors versus 
emerging elites and other societal actors.  
As far as alliance behavior is concerned for the first group of states, the 
western democracies, contemporary alliance theories including democratic peace 
propositions may hold true. However, for other states, particularly the torn states 
that are undergoing the most dramatic transformations, alliance theories that 
emphasize state power or democratic regimes cannot sufficiently address the 
behavior of states. In the conflictive power reconfiguration process a torn state may 
be divided into a hard realm where the national agenda is shaped by bureaucrats, the 
military and elites; and a realm of low politics in which civilian actors can shape the 
national agenda (109-110). In the following section, I endeavor to bring clarity to 
the concept of “national agenda” (or “national interest”) and will attempt to provide 
some answers regarding the effects of the transformation of domestic politics on the 
external behavior of states.  
 
2. 2. National Interest 
The “national agenda” can be conceived of as the “national interest;” that is, a set of 
principles that delineate the purpose and scope of state action. A brief overview of 
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the evolution of the term and a taxonomy of its place in contemporary international 
relations theory may be useful.  
The national interest is central to the discussion for several reasons. Many 
will recognize it as the basis for state behavior. Critical observers (Aron, 1966: 89) 
may charge that the national interest is widely used as a legitimating tool and is 
often subject to changes depending on who's in charge - as such the term lacks 
substance. But this is what makes the concept so important. Understanding how, 
why and by whom national interest is crafted can yield answers to the matter of 
transformations within states and their implications for foreign policy and alliance 
behavior.  
 One important aspect of the national interest is that it has arisen in tandem 
with the modern state. In a classical study, Meinecke (1998; Burchill, 2005: 17-18) 
traced the origins of the national interest and its evolution in subsequent centuries. 
The idea emerged in the 16th century as a response to sovereigns' need to preserve 
and expand their power whilst also fulfilling the needs of their subjects as ordained 
by the social contract (Burchill, 2005: 17). In this age of nascent absolutism, raison 
d'etat (reason of state) was one and the same with the power of the sovereign - this 
was most famously expressed by Louis XIV as "L'Etat, c'est moi!" Even if nations 
may act on secondary interests owing to their unique dispositions, no moral 
considerations could be higher than the preservation of the state. Consider the 
statement: "Thus must you act, if you wish to preserve the power of the State whose 
care is in your hands; and you may act thus, because no other means exist which 
lead to that end" (Meinecke, 1998: 10).  Yet, with the advent of the enlightenment 
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domestic politics could now accommodate morally guided action in what became 
known as the age of enlightened absolutism. Though the balance of power still 
preoccupied cabinets, middle class driven processes of democratization further 
integrated the nation with raison d'etat in the form of the doctrine of national self-
determination. As Rousseau pointed out, people and the nation are inseparable 
(Burchill, 2005: 24).  
 National interest can both be considered a means for justifying policy and an 
analytical tool (Frankel, 1970: 15-16; Rosenau, 1968: 34). It was only after the 
Second World War that the concept became an analytical tool to assess the foreign 
policies of nations (Burchill, 2005: 29). As a response to Carr's challenge to create 
an intellectually rigorous science of international politics Morgenthau wrote Politics 
Among Nations, arguing that there must be objective facts that govern foreign 
policy, which can enable us to assess the prudence of particular courses of action. 
The defining feature of the realist paradigm is that interests are defined in terms of 
power; it is a realm that stands apart from ethics, religion and ideology 
(Morgenthau, 1985: 10-11). The national interest encompasses the preservation of 
the state, its physical and cultural components, from encroachments by other powers 
(Burchill, 2005: 38). This is important because even if national interests are formed 
by decision-makers who may be influenced by a variety of interest groups, at the 
end of the day, foreign policy will reflect a compromise that best serves the ultimate 
interests of a state (Morgenthau, 1985: 289).  
 Morgenthau's work found criticism from, among others, those who assert the 
preeminence of impersonal structures in shaping state policy (Jackson, Sorensen, 
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2003: 87-88). Enter the world of neorealism. In an anarchic system that molds states 
into like-units, states' ultimate goal is survival. For this end, states "will attempt to 
accumulate power or enter into cooperative defense arrangements with greater 
strategic powers (Burchill, 2005: 47). Neorealists reject the notion that internal 
characteristics of states exercise decisive influence on their international behavior 
because of the overarching anarchy of the international system. The state is a neutral 
power-broker between society's various sectional interests (Burchill, 2005: 47-48). 
For Krasner, who argues that the national interest can be discerned through the 
statements and policies of decision-makers, the national interest transcends the 
narrow interests of groups and classes. However, depending on the power of the 
state in the international system, a state can pursue an ideological, imperialist, 
foreign policy that places the ideology of decision-makers above the material 
interests of the state (Krasner, 2009). Gilpin (1989: 18) argues that the "objectives 
and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their 
dominant members or ruling coalitions." Randall Schweller makes a similar case in 
that elites formulate and execute policy but they are constrained both by structural 
pressures and domestic difficulties such as an uncooperative society or dissensus 
among themselves (Schweller, 2006: 59).  
 Other theoretical approaches do not feature such an elaborate concept of 
national interest. The state is considered important by liberals too as Adam Smith 
argued that states need to ensure the security of their people so that a stable 
environment can produce prosperity (Burchill, 2005: 108). States may also seek to 
promote interdependence through free trade. Various shades of liberalism advocate 
trade and fostering interdependence as a goal for states (Sorensen, 2003: 112). 
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Others emphasize the need to promote democracy around the world in the hopes of 
establishing perpetual peace (Kant, 2003: 490). In short, liberals may concede that 
state security is important insofar as it would ensure the security of people and 
ensure prosperity. Cooperation is easy and in the interest of states.   
 As a compromise between the former two approaches, the presence of an 
international society of states and the consequent primacy of morality affect the 
national interest according to the English School (Burchill, 2005: 153-155).  The 
English School advances the notion of an international society of states wherein 
states have common moral obligations. Although basic realist principles such as 
anarchy, power and survival are manifest, states are mutually obliged to maintain a 
standard of conduct with each other in their relations. The national interest is not 
limited to narrow goals of maximizing power; states must consider matters of 
legitimacy and common interest that transcend realist principles. Most importantly, 
all states, great powers and small ones alike, have an interest to promote 
international order - however, no international obligation can contradict the national 
interest of sovereign states (Jackson & Sorenen, 2003).  
 Marxist and other critical approaches identify the national interest as simply 
a pretext of the capitalist class which seeks to mobilize society and justify their 
policies with this vague concept (Burchill, 2005: 153-155). Material forces 
determine power relations among actors. Powerful economic actors can articulate 
their particularistic class interests as a common interest for society to pursue. 
Because these groups hold all economic power, they are also able to control 
knowledge as well. Class interest may very well be more important than the 
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wellbeing of society as the capitalist classes from different nations pursue their 
common interest of subjugation of working classes, which may even necessitate 
international war.    
 Finally, constructivists concede that states have unwavering goals such as 
ensuring their survival and economic well-being. Nevertheless, they emphasize the 
importance of identities of actors in determining interests (Burchill, 2005: 195). 
While realists argue international anarchy socializes states into "like-actors," 
constructivists maintain that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). That 
is to say, over time in the course of state interactions, states can come to acquire new 
identities and, therefore, new preferences. States' interests are constructed rather 
than exogenously given. As interests and identities change overtime due to 
socialization, so too are national interests subject to change (Burchill, 2005: 38).  
 Aside from the vital need to maintain the sovereign existence of the state, the 
national interest appears to be a malleable concept. It may be employed as a 
legitimating tool for policy elites, a guideline for policies, or simply as a measuring 
stick to evaluate policies. Whatever the case, the national interest appears central to 
the issue of state behavior. As such, it is perhaps a useful tool for analyzing state 
behavior where other approaches fall short. What can be said of the national interest 
in a globalizing age? For, this we have to return to the discussion on the impact of 
structural forces on states, which are not as undifferentiated as we first though 
because structural forces led to different outcomes in different types of states. 
Developed countries can accommodate a shift in the national agenda (Aydınlı, 2005: 
109). The rise of new actors is accompanied by a process of desecuritization. 
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Survival is important, but the scope of foreign policy broadens to include ‘low 
politics.’ Elites in weak states, on the other hand, cannot afford the risk of letting go 
of the reins of power. Many such countries face an external hostile environment as 
well as domestic weaknesses – most notably, an inability to extract concessions 
from society without resorting to coercive measures. Their national agenda is very 
much geared towards securitization and the preservation of the regime.  
As mentioned earlier, structural forces induce the creation of a dual structure 
in torn states. On the one hand are “state” elements represented by old elites, the 
military and bureaucracy, and then there are new civilian actors emerging as a result 
of democratization. The former is primarily interested in traditional security 
concerns and may securitize the issue of emerging actors. The emerging actors, on 
the other hand, may desecuritize the national agenda and articulate a new array of 
topics. This bifurcation of the national agenda results in a dual governance structure 
where the old elites manage anarchy, and the new political elites respond to 
pressures for liberalization. Inevitably, the rise of new elites raises the issue of 
sharing power. In the resulting socio-political conflict, old elites may engage in 
securitization to justify their control over the state. Similarly, the new elites may 
take measures to discredit the “state” in order to enhance their popularity and 
buttress their political power. 
Based on the various realist propositions above, national interest is a policy 
guideline articulated by decision-making elites - it accounts for both foreign and 
domestic policy. While the basic desire of any government is to perpetuate the 
survival of the state, secondary policies and the tactics -or means to do so- may 
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reflect the distinct power relations among elites. While it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible (Aron, 1966), to objectively assess the national interest (Frankel, 
1970), one can attempt to distinguish between “objective” elements; those that 
pertain to the survival of the state, the common good of the nation and the vision 
promoted by leaders; and “subjective” elements that leaders may be employing for 
self-aggrandizement.  
To understand the transformation of these states and changes in their alliance 
behavior, the proposed study must compare the national agenda of a state before and 
after it began its transformation, mindful of how and by whom it is shaped and for 
what purpose. The next section outlines the proposed research method. 
 
 
2. 3. The Case Study Method 
 
It may be possible to infer relevant hypotheses by observing the transformation 
process of a torn state and its alliance behavior using a case study method. A case 
study is defined by George and Bennett (2004: 5) as “the detailed examination of an 
aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events.” The main advantage of a case-study approach is in 
exploring causal mechanisms. Case studies encompass a variety of methods for the 
purpose of, among other things, describing an event for future research, explaining a 
phenomenon in conjunction with existing theories, inferring new theories, and 
testing the validity of theories (George, Bennett, 2004: 76). This research will strive 
to identify a new hypothesis and identify new variables for alliance behavior. For the 
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purposes of this study, a broad historical period needs to be observed – alliance 
relations in the period before democratization and after. A “before-after” approach 
requires dividing a longitudinal case into two sub-cases theories (George, Bennett, 
2004: 76). A longitudinal case study can enable a researcher to observe a 
phenomenon before and after the change in a variable: how were alliances forged 
and maintained before democratization; how were they managed afterwards; and 
what implication does this have for the endurance of an alliance?  
For the purpose of understanding the impact of democratization on alliance 
behavior, on the endurance of alliances, the proposed research design needs to 
analyze an instance of a successfully democratizing, decentralizing, state that has 
experienced sharp changes in its relations towards its allies. This would also entail 
comparing the way the country's foreign policy was conceived before the transition 
process and after - in short, how and by whom were policies conceived, and how are 
they now conducted differently. 
 
 
2. 4. Case Study: Turkish-Israeli Alliance 
 
Case studies are often criticized because of the problem of case selection bias 
theories (George & Bennett, 2004: 22-23). The major criterion for this study is in 
finding an instance of a democratizing country that is also experiencing changes in 
its behavior towards allies. The literature review in the previous chapter identified 
the South Korea-US alliance as such an example. A different and more suitable case 
is the Turkish-Israeli alliance. Forged in 1996, the alliance has essentially collapsed 
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in a little over a decade - a very brief time indeed. It also coincides with an era of 
transformation of Turkey's domestic politics. Furthermore, this case satisfies several 
of the criteria suggested by van Evra (1997: 80) for choosing cases. The researcher 
has the opportunity to access a myriad of primary sources and secondary sources 
regarding the Turkish-Israeli alliance. Furthermore, van Evra (1997: 83) 
recommends selecting cases “that resemble current situations of policy concerns.” 
The growing hostility between Israel and Turkey is a salient political issue that has 
sparked much controversy.  
Turkey is an interesting case because its history of westernization and 
modernization has produced a situation where Turkey exhibited a desire to liberalize 
but at the same time it wanted to centralize power through securitization.  Both were 
seen as necessary for elevating Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization, 
which would mitigate the dangers of international anarchy all states face. For much 
of its history, Turkey had to juggle a set of external and internal security threats, 
which produced a unique structure where a strong military and bureaucracy with 
centralizing, securitizing, tendencies that defined and executed vital policies, while a 
weaker realm of civilian politicians that could take care of mundane tasks of 
governance with the consent of the former.  
The Turkish-Israeli Alliance is a suitable case because the alliance was 
conceived at a time when Turkey, although a democracy, was still a guarded regime 
where the military exerted a strong presence in the conduct of foreign policy. The 
1990s was a tumultuous period in the Middle East. While the international system 
was reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Middle East became a host to 
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problems such as the Persian Gulf War. In this period, Turkey found itself at odds 
with its two neighbors to the South. The abundance of PKK activities compounded 
Turkey’s difficulties as the PKK received help from these states. These external 
threats served as the rationale for the military's interference in foreign policy-
making. Further complicating Turkey's situation was the perception that Turkey's 
strategic importance had diminished as a result of the end of the Cold War. Turkey 
had to once more enhance its international position, and an alliance with a country 
that was thought to have clout in Washington D.C. was consistent with avoiding 
international isolation.   
These external threats were compounded by security problems emanating 
from within Turkey. The PKK was a danger to both the physical well-being of 
Turkish citizens, as well as being a political movement that called into question the 
very existence of the Turkish state and its institutions. Political Islam was another 
threat because it too questioned the legitimacy of the Republican regime. The 
possibility of politics being hijacked by religious reactionaries was one of the main 
reasons why such a dual governance structure emerged in the first place (Aydınlı, 
2010; Akman 2004). Inevitably, Islamic fundamentalism was securitized as a grave 
threat to Republican values. It was in this security context that Turkey's military 
decision-makers approached Israel, which had its own security problems. In the 
resulting trade and military cooperation agreements, an “alliance” formed between 
Turkey and Israel. It must be said, however, that intelligence sharing could be traced 
to an earlier period as Israel provided Turkey with intelligence reports on terrorist 
organizations such as ASALA (Fisk, 1999).  An alliance with Israel was a panacea 
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to the unfavorable international conjuncture and the emergence of domestic 
elements hostile to the "state" elements of Turkey.  
The alliance was not without problems though. Turkey’s association with 
Israel provoked resentment among Middle Eastern powers. For example, Turkey 
was harshly criticized in the eighth Summit of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference for its ties with Israel (Kosebalaban, 2010: 36). The Palestinian issue 
was yet another problem. Turkey frequently expressed its disapproval of Israeli 
policy towards Palestinians, but, cooperation between the two continued. One must 
also not forget Turkey's problems with political Islam. Some argue (Yavuz, 1997) 
that Turkey's alliance with Israel was forged to emphasize Turkey's western identity 
and to belittle political Islamists such as then incumbent Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan.  
In recent years, the fabric of Turkish politics has been changing. Turkey has 
witnessed the meteoric rise of the AKP and its constituents as a new force in Turkish 
politics. The unwieldy coalition governments of the 1990s have given way to a 
single dominant party that is able to conduct a foreign policy of its own accord. Part 
of the reason why it is able to do so effectively is because the power of the military 
has been in decline. Institutional/legal changes have been underway since before the 
AKP won the 2002 elections and have been geared towards reducing the role of the 
military in decision-making. Furthermore, the AKP have worked towards 
discrediting the old Republican elite. Depreciating the alliance with Israel was 
consistent with the objective of discrediting the old elite responsible for the alliance. 
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It was also a popular move domestically as voters wanted the government to adopt a 
harsher stance on Israel (Oğuzlu, 2010).  
As far as the alliance is concerned relations have become increasingly tense 
since 2008, starting with Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip and the collateral 
damage inflicted on civilians with phosphorous bombs, which provoked public 
outrage. The Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, spoke against Israel and condemned 
the operation. In January 2009, at the Davos Summit, Erdoğan stormed off stage 
during the Israeli President’s speech. Israeli leaders soon reciprocated Erdoğan’s 
vituperations. The Israeli Foreign Minister engineered a diplomatic incident in 
which the Turkish Ambassador to Tel-Aviv was humiliated by being seated on a 
“low chair” as a sign of disrespect. Finally, on May 31 2010, IDF Forces conducted 
a raid on a Turkish ship “Mavi Marmara” in international waters. The ship was on 
course to Gaza to deliver aid when IDF forces intercepted the ship. In the ensuing 
struggle, nine Turkish activists died. This prompted a UN led international inquiry. 
More importantly, it was seen as the final straw. Military activities between Turkey 
and Israel were suspended and both countries, by Turkey’s insistence, reduced the 
level of diplomatic representation as both countries recalled their ambassadors. 
Erdoğan impressed on the Israeli government Turkey’s conditions for the 
normalization of relations (Myers, 2011): “As long as Israel does not apologize, 
does not pay compensation and does not lift the embargo on Palestine, it is not 
possible for Turkey-Israeli ties to improve.” Once allies, Turkey now considers 
Israel a threat to the stability of the region (Kosebalaban, 2010: 38).  
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While neither the structural context in which Turkey conducts its 
international relations, nor the domestic threats have changed in any significant way, 
Turkey’s behavior towards a close partner has become erratic to the point that 
relations were eventually severed. Theoretically, all of this means a change in the 
actors who articulate and pursue Turkey's policies and would suggest a change in the 
dual-governance structure of Turkey whereby power has shifted away from the 
"state" to the "government." To elaborate, before the transformation of Turkey’s 
domestic politics, the statist elite had both the power and will to pursue policies that 
may, at times, have contradicted the sentiments of its public. They were greatly 
concerned with maintaining the security of the state and perpetuating the Republican 
regime. As such Turkey behaved in a manner that in many respects were consistent 
with the traditional understanding of international relations and alliances. For 
example, an alliance with Israel was/could be conceived as in the national interest of 
Turkey.  
Yet, after the transformation process Turkey’s national interest has changed 
such that an alliance with Israel against external threats and internal threats against 
the regime was no longer appropriate. Turkey’s new elites have articulated an 
altogether different vision for Turkish foreign policy. Unencumbered by the 
traditionally powerful military, the AKP implemented its foreign policy. Whether 
due to ideological convictions or political pragmatism of the ruling party, the 
Turkish-Israeli alliance was not worth maintaining. First of all, Turkey's relations 
with Iran and Syria, countries which Israel considers threats, improved. This change 
in threat perception is not due to any material changes or the regimes of these 
countries; it is due to the change in Turkey's elites who have desecuritized relations 
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with these countries. Secondly, a desire to become a regional leader meant that 
Turkey not only had to improve its relations with many countries that consider Israel 
a major antagonist, but it would also have to deal with important regional issues like 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, standing up to Israel in the period since 2008 has 
been a remarkably popular policy domestically.         
    
 
2. 5. The Framework of Analysis and Conceptualizations 
 
This study will utilize a power-centric, actor-oriented approach. Recalling that 
theorizing on alliances have mostly taken place within the realist paradigm, it may 
be pertinent to deliberate on the power relationships between actors. In the realist 
paradigm, national interest is very much rooted in the state’s desire to acquire power 
and ensure its survival. Even if domestic actors affected foreign policy (and 
therefore, alliances) to some degree, nobody could hijack policy and pursue policies 
contrary to the survival of the state.  
 Earlier we identified globalization and democratization as forces affecting 
states. The effect of these processes of decentralization is that states concede power 
to new domestic actors. However, states with weaker institutions are susceptible to 
losing their ability to manage affairs. One can at least expect such states to elicit 
unpredictable behavior. For example, Turkey's domestic structure has traditionally 
featured a 'strong state' in which the military and bureaucracy exercised greater 
control over affairs than did civilian governments (Aydınlı, 2010). A similar 
situation also applies to Iran as well where a hard realm of the inner state is 
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juxtaposed to a softer realm represented by the apparent state made up of elected 
officials (Aydınlı, 2010: 701). What are the implications of shifts in such systems 
towards the ‘softer realm’?  
Emerging actors are able to take greater part in the shaping of policies 
without interference from the security establishment.  It also means that the 
composition of elites, decision-makers, have also changed. A reduction in the power 
of state elements have led to the rise of new elites and civil society actors, which 
results in a change in the national interest, foreign policy behavior, alliance behavior 
and the sustainability or endurance of alliances. But why do new elites act 
differently?  
 First of all, they may have a fundamentally different conception of the state 
and different world vision than those of the old elite, which may change the alliance 
preferences (Schweller, 2006: 64-66). Secondly, the new elites may have a different 
understanding of who and what constitutes a security threat. Thirdly, the basic 
feature of any political group is that it wishes to remain in power. Although the 
principle of the "iron rule of oligarchy" may sound like a harsh criticism, the fact of 
the matter is that no policies can be enacted without votes. Governments operating 
in the old dual governance structure could not afford to undertake any significant 
populist policies that contradicted the military (the most salient example is the short-
lived Erbakan-Çiller coalition government in 1996-1997).  With the decline of the 
military and old elites, governments can do what is necessary to attract votes without 
fear. In this respect, some have suggested that the Turkish public is critical of Israel, 
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which is why the AKP, against its better judgment, was compelled to display such 
an overtly hostile attitude towards Israeli policy (Oğuzlu, 2010: 276).      
 To sum up, these new actors become the decision-makers who define the 
national interest and pursue, or justify, their policies accordingly. Therefore, a shift 
in domestic power as described above may very well lead to a reinvention, at least in 
part, of the national interest, precipitating in both a change in foreign policy and 
alliance behavior.   
These propositions will be evaluated by applying a levels of analysis 
framework to the Turkish-Israeli alliance. Specifically, it will feature a comparison 
of Turkey's domestic politics and foreign policy in a period starting with the end of 
the Cold War to 2001, with the AKP period until early 2012. The alliance theories 
identified in the literature review will form the basis for the comparison. I will look 
at system-level forces such as the distribution of capabilities as well as threats to 
Turkey in both periods. For distribution of capabilities I will utilize the Correlates of 
War data in the period of 1990-2007 to observe if any significant changes in the 
balance of power have taken place which could account for the collapse of the 
alliance. For threats, I will assess the literature on Turkish foreign policy and seek 
any structural changes that may have accounted for the rise and sudden collapse of 
the Turkish-Israeli alliance. My initial prognosis is that there is no significant 
change in regional distribution of capabilities or threats, or pressures for 
liberalization. Pressures for centralization and decentralization both seem to be 
present at this level.   
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 I then look at the state-level, evaluating domestic threats such as the PKK 
and political Islam to address omnibalancing propositions. Next, I will scrutinize the 
Turkish military and the legal institutional laws that delineate its power. Significant 
changes have taken place. Turkey's elites will also be analyzed. This includes a 
comprehensive understanding of the old elites that were inured to the dual 
governance structure and the new AKP elites who have a different foreign policy 
vision altogether. I then consider the role and influence of civil society in both 
periods. I will finally compare Turkey's national interest in both periods. This will 
be based on government documents (such as the National Security Concept) as well 
as the speeches and policies of governments in both periods. I will utilize primary 
sources such as speeches and newspaper articles as well as secondary documents 
dealing with Turkey's foreign policy.        
I consider the Turkish state within the aforementioned dual governance 
structure. Unlike the Western conception of the state which does not distinguish 
between state and government, the Turkish system featured a 'hard' realm composed 
of the Turkish military and security establishment, and the bureaucracy juxtaposed 
to a 'soft' civilian realm in which elected civilian governments exercised, albeit 
limited, power over national affairs. To reiterate, the state is a governmental agency. 
It is the sum of central institutions, which govern a nation and carry out its 
administrative functions, as well as the groups, including their values, that control 
them.  This dual arrangement is largely a product of Turkey's desire to liberalize to 
rise above the level contemporary civilization, while, at the same time its concern in 
insulating itself from all perceived external and internal threats. Changes in this 
structure can be observed in legal amendments regarding the role of the security 
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establishment and the ability of the government to fulfill its objectives. For example, 
a change in the structure of Turkey's National Security Council would suggest a 
reduction in the influence of the military in decision-making.  
Based on the various realist propositions above, national interest is a policy 
guideline articulated by decision-making elites - it accounts for both foreign and 
domestic policy. While the basic desire of any government is to perpetuate the 
survival of the state, secondary policies and the tactics -or means to do so- may 
reflect the distinct power relations among elites. While it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible (Aron, 1966), to objectively assess the national interest (Frankel, 
1970), I will endeavor to distinguish between “objective” elements; those that 
pertain to the survival of the state, the common good of the nation and the vision 
promoted by leaders; and “subjective” elements that leaders may be employing for 
self-aggrandizement.   
Alliance is conceptualized as the “formal or informal relationship of security 
cooperation between two or more states and involving mutual expectations of some 
degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the 
future” (Levy, Barnett, 1991: 370). It should be implicit that some level of 
cooperation in other fields and harmony in foreign relations are to be expected in an 
alliance arrangement. Unpredictability or inconsistency of an ally’s behavior would 
mean that one or both parties are 1) not complying with their alliance duties; 2) 
articulating clashing foreign policy and security interests; 3) adopting a hostile 
rhetoric against the other member; 4) calling for sanctions against the other party in 
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multilateral environments; 5) engaging, deliberately, in policies that may alienate the 
other party.  
 
 
2. 6. Application of the Research Design 
 
Chapter 3 will apply the framework above and analyze the domestic and foreign 
policy of Turkey in the 1990s based on structural factors such as power aggregation 
and threat perceptions; and unit-level variables such as domestic threats, institutions, 
elites and civil society. Most importantly, it will attempt to explain the interplay of 
Turkey's military-bureaucratic institutions and elites and how the national interest in 
that period resulted in a foreign policy conducive to a Turkish-Israeli alliance.  
 Chapter 4 will recreate the framework above comparing and contrasting the 
1990s with the AKP period. The decentralization of power, institutional changes and 
the emergence of vastly different new elites led to a new situation in which an 
alliance with Israel was no longer compatible with Turkey's interests; Israel is now 
considered a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East. In fact, Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan labeled Israel a source of instability in the 
region in a speech he delivered at the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2011.  
My guess is that Turkey faced similar structural pressures and domestic 
security threats in both periods. However, at the domestic level there are dramatic 
changes in Turkey's elites and institutions. An initial comparative chart may suggest 
the process of democratization produced a situation in which new elites could dictate 
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foreign policy by redefining Turkey's national interest, all of which led to the 
collapse of the alliance.  
Table 1. Comparative assessment of variables in the 1990s and AKP period 
Level of Analysis Variable (Changes if applicable) 90s 00s 
System-Level Need for power aggregation Yes Yes 
 Structural threats conducive to alliance Yes Yes 
State/society-Level Internal Threats  Yes Yes 
 
Old institutions and former elites control the 
discharge of state functions  Yes No 
 
 
 
2. 7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter called into question the viability of structural alliance theories in 
understanding alliance behavior in a changing world. In torn states, ones feeling the 
brunt of global pressures, the most salient feature was the fragmentation of the state 
elite and, consequently, the bifurcation of the national agenda. The national agenda, 
or nation interest, while concerned with the existence of the state, is a nebulous 
concept that can be manipulated. A comparison of the national agenda of a state 
before and after a significant period of domestic transformation could reveal the 
extent to which traditional alliance theories can, if at all, explain state behavior in 
contemporary times. The weakening of traditional elites against emerging elites with 
a wider agenda may be affecting state behavior in an adverse way.  
  
 
48 
 
To find out, I proposed a comparative longitudinal case study in which the 
rise of the Turkish-Israeli alliance in the 1990s would be juxtaposed to the decline of 
the alliance in the AKP period by comparing changes in system level and state level 
variables identified in the literature review in Chapter I.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE MAKING OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
 
 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will deal with the international and domestic conjuncture of Turkey in 
the 1990s and explicate the circumstances in which the Turkish-Israeli alliance was 
forged. True to the levels of analysis framework, the first step will be to explore 
Turkey's neighborhood by analyzing Turkey's international relations and identifying 
structural factors that may have contributed to the Turkish-Israeli alliance. This will 
be followed by an examination of state-level variables including domestic threats, 
elites and institutions, and civil society. All will be examined in the context of 
Turkey's dual governance structure wherein the hard, bureaucratic, elements of the 
state prevailed over the soft government in making foreign policy decisions 
throughout the 1990s, particularly during the short-lived REFAH-YOL coalition 
government.  
The next chapter will reproduce the framework presented above and apply 
it to the AKP era in Turkish foreign policy. Changes, if any, in these variables may 
account for the declining relations between Turkey and Israel in recent years. 
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3. 2.Turkish-Israeli Relations in the 1990s 
 
Turkey was among the first countries to recognize Israel when it became an 
independent state in 1949. However, Turkey did not develop its relations with Israel 
greatly. Not taking sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or not alienating either side, 
became an important principle of Turkish foreign policy (Robins, 1991: 75-76). The 
two countries were briefly allied in the 1960s. However, the 1967 war was 
condemned by Turkey. In 1985, Israel’s withdrawal from most of Lebanon was a 
positive sign for Turkey that Israel was not a threat to Turkey, which promoted 
military elites from both countries to establish contacts (Lochery, 1998: 48). 
Relations started afresh in 1992 when Turkey upgraded its relations with Israel to 
the ambassadorial level. The positive developments between Israel and the PLO 
during 1993 and 1994 further legitimized Turkey’s interactions with Israel (Lochery, 
1998: 47). In 1993, Turkey and Israel signed a framework agreement in which the 
two countries would cooperate in energy matters and enable Israel to penetrate 
Central Asian markets (Yavuz, 1997: 28). This was followed up by a free trade 
agreement in April 1994 and another in 1996. In February 1996, a military 
cooperation agreement was signed that would, among other things, allow joint 
training, access to facilities, and intelligence cooperation. This was furthered by 
another deal in June 1996 when the Israeli arms industry was entrusted to modernize 
the Turkish air force. By the beginning of the millennium, Turkish-Israeli alignment 
covered a wide variety of areas including intelligence and security cooperation, 
trade, and tourism. Turkey benefited from an annual influx of a quarter of a million 
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Israeli tourists (Inbar, 2005: 591), not to mention an annual trade volume of 1.5 
billion USD in 2003 (up from 200 million USD in 1993 see: Inbar, 2003: 105).   
The suddenness with which the alliance emerged and developed is 
remarkable. A levels of analysis approach may yield some answers regarding the 
nature of these developments. 
 
 
3. 3. System-Level  
 
The 1990s inaugurated the collapse of the Soviet Union. The distinguishing feature 
of a bipolar international system is the rigidity of alignment behavior and foreign 
policy interactions. The unipolar moment (Krauthammer, 1990/1991) following the 
end of Cold War would allow for greater freedom of action in foreign policy. The 
new environment was one in which Turkey could now practice a more active, 
multifaceted, foreign policy towards a wider region. Turkey no longer shared a land 
border with the Soviet Union, its Cold War antagonist, and it could now interact 
with the new Turkic Republics of the Former Soviet Union on a wide array of 
issues.  
The Turkish-Israeli alliance could be a product of a desire for power-
aggregation in the face of growing threat perceptions and changes in system polarity. 
For example, the ebb of Soviet power in the Middle East may have meant that US 
aid to its allies in the region might also diminish the effect that Turkey and Israel 
had to combine forces to compensate for this (Picolli, 1999: 73-74). To put it 
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differently, the end of the Cold War reduced the strategic importance of Turkey in 
NATO- the end of the Cold War called into question the very existence of NATO 
and the Western alliance. Another important factor is the US Congress. The 
establishment of an Armenian Republic galvanized the Armenian lobby in US and 
threatened bilateral relations. As relations were already troubled with the ban on 
sales of high-tech weaponry to Turkey, Turkey needed to enlist the Israel lobby as a 
means to counter further Armenian moves and achieved some degree of success (Bir 
& Sherman, 2002: 27). 
Table 2. Distribution of Capabilities (percent of world share) in selected countries (Singer, 1987) 
 Turkey Syria Israel Iraq Iran 
1991 0.013974 0.004718 0.002919 0.008263 0.010411 
1992 0.013895 0.004427 0.003614 0.005982 0.010515 
1993 0.014474 0.004848 0.003850 0.006072 0.010706 
1994 0.015650 0.003928 0.003491 0.006228 0.011503 
1995 0.015700 0.003919 0.003969 0.006097 0.011840 
1996 0.016448 0.004092 0.004352 0.006123 0.011984 
1997 0.016757 0.004227 0.004496 0.005741 0.012515 
1998 0.016803 0.004078 0.004086 0.006025 0.012163 
1999 0.016696 0.004067 0.003961 0.005996 0.012310 
2000 0.015004 0.004224 0.004063 0.006011 0.012411 
2001 0.013859 0.004525 0.004202 0.006223 0.012638 
2002 0.013985 0.004390 0.003964 0.006809 0.012399 
2003 0.013909 0.004364 0.003861 0.006627 0.012507 
2004 0.013876 0.004463 0.003702 0.005752 0.012478 
2005 0.013953 0.004456 0.003790 0.004729 0.012437 
2006 0.014252 0.004446 0.003816 0.005205 0.013648 
2007 0.014317 0.004454 0.003638 0.005222 0.013450 
 
Realists would suggest an assessment of the relative distribution of 
capabilities. Examination reveals that the distribution of capabilities among Turkey 
and its neighbors have more or less remained static in the post-Cold War period 
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(Figure 1). In fact, at roughly 1.5% of world capabilities Turkey's capabilities were 
mightier than its neighbors'. If any form of balancing was taking place in the Middle 
East, it would have been against Turkey. Indeed, Turkey had a troubled relationship 
with its neighbors and so an assessment of regional threats is required.  
Most pressing of all were the problems emanating from Turkey’s southern 
neighbors because they had implications for the PKK problem and, therefore, 
Turkey’s territorial integrity and national values. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
prompted an international response in January 1991 in the form of a UN mandated 
intervention under the leadership of the US. Although Turgut Özal, then president of 
Turkey, was in favor of actively participating in the operations (Karabelias, 2008: 
459), the Turkish top-brass was reluctant. Nevertheless, Turkey made available its 
territory and military infrastructure to its allies taking part in operations against Iraq.  
More importantly, Turkey took part in maintaining the No-Fly Zone over Iraq in 
Operation Provide Comfort for the protection of Kurdish civilians under threat by 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Approximately two million Iraqi/Kurdish refugees made 
their way into Iran and Turkey to escape Saddam’s wrath. For a regime that 
perceived Kurdish separatism and the PKK problem as an existential threat, Turkey 
was perturbed by the developments in Iraq.   
Turkey also viewed Syria as a source of trouble. According to Aras and Polat 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria during the 1990s could be defined as 
“conscious alienation and controlled tension” (Aras & Polat, 2008: 509).  A 
permanent but minor factor in the equation was Syria’s irredentist claims over the 
Turkish province of Hatay. However, the major source of tension during the 1980s 
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and 1990s was with regards to the water sharing in the Tigris River. In 1980 Turkey 
began the GAP (Southern Anatolian Project) with the purpose of harnessing the 
hydroelectric and agricultural potential of the Tigris and Euphrates basin. It thus 
started building hydroelectric dams and irrigation systems over the Tigris River. 
Syria viewed this development with suspicion. Hostilities towards Turkey among 
the Syrian elites greatly increased.  
Between 1980 and 1998, Syria aided the PKK by providing them with 
accommodation and access to training camps. However, Syria’s aid to PKK 
increased gradually; first after 1985 when Syrian elites believed Turkey was aiding 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, thus threatening the regime (Hamisch & Harnisch 
& Kircher, 2011: 20); and then again after the Gulf War. Tensions between the two 
countries were reduced in 1987 when Syria and Turkey signed a protocol, according 
to which Turkey pledged to grant Syria a water flow of at least 500 cubic meters per 
second. Nevertheless, the completion of the first phase of the GAP project in the 
early 1990s and Syria’s diplomatic isolation as a result of the Gulf War induced 
Syria to intensify its cooperation with the PKK (and other non-state actors) to 
balance its neighbors. When the Erbakan government sought to strike a deal with 
Syria in 1996 exchanging water for cessetion of Syrian support the PKK, Turkish 
president Süleyman Demirel reminded the government that Syria's complicity with 
PKK terrorism was unacceptable and no deals could be made until Syria changed its 
policies (Cumhuriyet, 1996a).    
Turkey also had troubled relations with Iran due to the secular establishment 
within Turkey and their fears regarding Iran's theocratic regime. It would be fair to 
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say that Iran was never seen as an existential threat, but simply as a threat to the 
secular republican order (Cumhuriyet, 1996b). Regardless, Iran also possessed 
ballistic missile capabilities which have the range to strike Turkish facilities (Picolli, 
1999: 73-74). 
Turkey’s relations with Europe were no less eventful. On the other side of 
the Aegean, Greece’s negative attitudes toward Turkey persisted. Although the 
domestic politics of Turkey will be discussed at length below, some aspects of the 
Turkish polity are relevant to Turkey’s relations with Europe. These were played out 
in the context of Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Turkey suffered setbacks in its 
quest to become an EU member. Furthermore, Turkey faced international criticism 
with regards to its human rights abuses and the Kurdish problem. This restricted 
Turkey’s access to weapons which compelled Turkish leaders to galvanize the 
embryonic defense industry through different channels - such as Israel. Turkey also 
needed to circumvent the various limitations on the trade of arms. The partnership 
with Israel allowed Turkey access to the sophisticated Israeli Military Industrial 
Complex without any strings attached (Yavuz, 1997: 27). Thus, structurally 
speaking, being shunned by Europe in the 1990s may have been another reason for 
the Turkish-Israeli partnership (Oğuzlu, 2010). 
Turkey faced a variety of security problems and diplomatic challenges from 
its neighborhood. There is evidence to suggest that the threats emanating from Iran, 
Iraq and Syria could be construed as a basis for Turkey's decision to align with 
Israel. The aggression of the Saddam regime in Iraq and Syria’s decision to aid PKK 
had implications for Turkey’s security. Both Turkey and Israel gained enhanced 
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deterrence as well as enhanced coercive diplomacy (Bir & Sherman, 2002). This can 
be seen in Turkey’s ability to pressure Syria with regards to the PKK and this 
alleviated the PKK problem at home. Balancing alliances and military interventions 
and other security-oriented actions were therefore present in the foreign policy 
repertoire of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s (Altunışık & Martin, 2011: 571).  
Nevertheless, conceptualizing these factors as “threats” and “weaknesses” 
does not lead to a full picture.  For one, Turkey also felt structural pressures of 
globalization; of the need to liberalize. This is clearly visible in Turkey’s relations 
with EU and EU countries as well as its desire to engage economically the countries 
of the Former Soviet Union. Furthermore, one cannot but help the erosion of the 
foreign-domestic frontier in terms of security issues. Finally, as it will become 
apparent in the next chapter, Turkey’s international situation in the 2000s was very 
similar to the 1990s – in fact, it may have been more hostile in several respects such 
as the collapse of Iraq and Iran's nuclear ambitions. In fact, given the relative decline 
of Israeli and Turkish capabilities, and in view of Iran's agenda and world public 
opinion, the collapse of the alliance and Turkey's efforts to mediate between the 
West and Iran appears to be counterintuitive. Turkey's domestic politics also merit 
further enquiry.  
3. 4. State-Level  
 
3. 4. 1.Omnibalancing Internal Threats 
 
Turkey's domestic politics in this period witnessed an intensification of the conflict 
between the state and "subversive" elements in the Turkish polity. Kurdish 
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separatism, which manifested itself in the form of terrorist acts instigated by the 
PKK, as well as religious extremism (irtica) were considered to be threats. In fact, a 
casual glance at contemporary news sources, such as the staunchly secularist 
Cumhuriyet, reveals the extent of the hostility felt by the statist elites. The PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers' Party) is one of such perceived threats by the republican regime 
as it carried out terrorist activities in the quest to establish a Kurdish state. 
Furthermore, Turkish authorities have also viewed Islamist movements as yet 
another threat to the existence of the secular regime. At the most intense period of 
civilian-military tensions in February 1997, the statist elite and its representatives 
viewed Islamic extremism and the PKK in the same light: This was succinctly 
expressed in the words of Yekta Güngör Özden, the former Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court, who said that "the religious Apo and the Kurdish Apo are 
indistinguishable" (Cumhuriyet, 1997g).  
Turkey's troubled relations with its neighbors were in no small part a result 
of Turkey's domestic problems. Indeed, there are forces within Turkey that 
cooperated with those without. The importance of the Kurdish problem and PKK are 
twofold. On the one hand, the persistence of the Kurdish problem contributed to the 
military’s presence in policy-making because separatism was an existential threat. 
On the other hand, it had an external dimension because neighboring countries 
(namely Iraq and Syria) provided the PKK with the means to carry out their 
operations, which increased Turkey’s threat perception from its neighbors. Soon 
after the establishment of the Turkish-Israeli alliance Turkey was able to pressure 
Syria with regards to the PKK thereby alleviating the PKK problem at home. In fact, 
by the beginning of 2000, the PKK had ended all terrorist activities as a ceasefire 
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came into effect. In addition to the PKK, Hezbollah was also active in Turkey's 
southeastern provinces (Cumhuriyet, 1997b). 
The Iranian regime, which had pretensions of exporting the Islamic 
revolution to its neighbors, particularly Turkey, was considered as a threat to the 
secular republican order in Turkey (Aras & Polat, 2008: 508). Furthermore, Iran was 
also held responsible for aiding the PKK "Ülkeyi Bölmek istiyorlar"(Cumhuriyet, 
1997g). Aras and Polat argue that the poor relations between Turkey and Iran was 
because of the overwhelming presence of Kemalist bureaucratic and military elite in 
Turkey’s foreign policymaking and their securitization of political Islam as an 
existential threat. The alliance with Israel served not only to consolidate Turkey’s 
western, secular, identity in a period of failing relations with EU and rising political 
Islamism (Yavuz, 1997).  For example, Yavuz (1997) argues that the alliance with 
Israel used to discredit the Erbakan government and political Islamists. The 
securitization of domestic threats such as political Islam and PKK, and, 
concomitantly, their emergence as external threats, inspired a 'secular alliance' with 
Israel (Altunışık & Martin, 2011: 571). As will be discussed at greater length below, 
the Turkish military accused Iran and Syria of supporting terrorist activities and 
interfered in domestic affairs to eventually oust Islamists from the government. 
 
3. 4. 2 Institution and Elites: Turkey's Dual Governance Structure 
 
Delving into the realm of the state and society level, any analysis is 
complicated by the numerous identity problems in the Turkish polity and the 
numerous actors that operate within Turkey. In the literature review presented 
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earlier, elites and institutions were identified as relevant forces shaping foreign 
policy and alignment behavior. Analyzing the two in separate sections would have 
intuitively been simpler. However, in the Turkish case, elites and public 
institutions are strongly enmeshed.  
4.2.1 Elites 
Elites are defined as a group of people that command a disproportionate 
amount of economic, political and social influence. It can be comprised of top 
decision-makers such as presidents and ministers; high-level public officials 
including bureaucrats and military officials; and other socially and economically 
significant actors such as academics and businessmen. Very often, these groups 
tend to be united along common values. The literature review discussed several 
ways in which elites affect state policy during democratization. Generally 
speaking, old elites securitize issues and engage in reactionary policies of 
identifying internal or external threats in a bid to exclude new elites and retain their 
own privileged positions (Snyder, 1991; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Snyder, 2001; 
Cederman et al, 2008). On the other hand, emerging elites may also pursue foreign 
and domestic policies aimed at attracting votes and discrediting old elites 
(Adamson, 2001; Lee, 2007b). As far as contemporary policy is concerned, the 
Turkish case falls in the latter category. The old elites have fallen from grace and it 
is the new elites that shape Turkey’s foreign policy. What follows is a brief 
overview of Turkey’s old elites.     
Turkey's statist elite, embodied by the bureaucracy and military, shared the 
common Kemalist heritage and were largely concerned with westernization and the 
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maintenance of the secular nature of the Turkish Republic and the progress of its 
society (Heper, 2002: 140). In contrast to these rational democrats and guardians of 
secularism were politicians with their particularistic agenda and irrational 
impulses. Understanding this binary in the context of a 'dual governance structure' 
may be more helpful (Aydınlı, 2005). Turkey's bifurcated domestic system features 
on the one hand a hard security-oriented realm represented by the military and 
bureaucracy, and, on the other, a soft realm of civilian politicians and elected 
governments. 
The “State” is comprised of civilian bureaucrats (most notably, the 
judiciary) and the military. These two, especially the military, formed an 
overarching structure above governments. However, this development is a 
comparatively recent one. Elites in the Ottoman Empire were comprised of a 
“patrimonial bureaucracy” that oversaw military and administrative affairs (Karpat, 
2012: 145). Under this bureaucracy, there also existed a religious elite (ulema) as 
well as local, sometimes tribal, rulers (ayan). Despite the inevitable 
decentralization of power during the course of the decline of the empire, 
subordinate elites were nevertheless bound to the state. Starting with the 19
th
 
century, Ottoman sultans, most notably Mahmud II, took steps to recentralize 
power and rear in the insubordinate elites through various methods (Karpat, 2012: 
151).  
What emerged was a Western educated state elite (Note: I will use “state 
elite,” “old elite,” and “Kemalist elite” interchangeably) that strove to defend the 
terminal Empire against competing imperial encroachments, while also managing 
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the process of liberalization, a requirement for genuine modernization (Aydınlı, 
2007). As a result of its political role, a security-oriented elite came to dominate 
the political system. This military-bureaucratic state elite was a driving force of the 
modernization of the Ottoman Empire. It was also this group that came to 
dominate the Turkish Republic and carry out nation-building in the Republican era. 
This was done through the inculcation of a modernist nationalism that sought to 
westernize Turkish society (Akman, 2004: 26-27). However, many reforms did not 
enjoy societal support. For this reason, democracy, though regarded as the most 
desirable system, was often thought to be contradictory to the westernization of 
society (Akman, 2004).  
Despite experiments with a multiparty political system, no political 
opposition could emerge in the early years of the Republic. The unfavorable 
international conjuncture after the Second World War compelled Turkish leaders 
to redouble their efforts at democratization because this was seen as a necessary 
step for Turkey’s participation in Western institutions (Karpat, 2012: 177). The 
Democrat Party won the ensuing elections in a land-slide. A period of impressive 
economic growth witnessed the emergence of a sizeable professional elite that did 
not depend on the state for its income (Karpat, 2012: 176). Concomitantly, the 
1950s also saw the decline of the societal status and income of officers. In 27 May 
1960, a coup was initiated by the lower echelons of the Turkish Armed Forces, 
who charged the government with violations against the constitution, secularism, 
as well undermining the military (Karpat, 2012: 179). The Turkish military had 
imbued itself with the mission to modernize Turkey and emerged as the “self-
proclaimed defender of “democracy” (constitutionalism), modernism and of 
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nationalism… and secularism” (Karpat, 2012: 143). The Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) allied itself with the military and once more came to power. Legal and 
institutional changes since 1960, of which more will be said in the next section, 
established the Turkish Armed Forces, and the state elite, as the most powerful 
group in the Turkish body politic.  
 Starting with the 1970s, a pro-Islamic bourgeoisie began to emerge. A wide 
variety of subordinate elites manifested themselves in political parties. There were 
utopian Islamists who voiced themselves under the banners various parties. In 
1969 Necmettin Erbakan issued the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) manifesto. The 
agenda was a new civilizational project aiming to achieve secular goals such as 
increasing the welfare of Turks, strengthening the economy and restoring Turkey's 
place as a great power. However, the outlook makes a distinction between Western 
and Islamic civilization and carries with it a distinct anti-imperialist flavor (Hale & 
Özbudun, 2010: 6). Most importantly, it advocates morality and religion at the 
heart of any political endeavor (Gündoğan, 2008). These ideas formed the party 
platforms of such parties as the National Order Party, National Salvation Party, and 
the Welfare Party, all of which rejected secularism. On the other hand, there were 
religiously conservative nationalists but economic liberalism. In the post-1980 
coup era, the latter group, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, came to power. 
This group not only undermined more radical Islamist parties, but it was, for a 
time, tolerated by the statist elite ((Karpat, 2012: 184). In the post-coup period, a 
national identity with a religious flavor appeared to be a useful tool to combat 
ethnic and ideological sectarian tensions within Turkey (Yavuz, 1997: 30). 
Increased enrollment of students at both religious schools and institutions of 
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tertiary education; as well as economic liberalization and privatization, contributed 
to the emergence of a new class of professionals and intellectuals that opposed the 
Kemalist elite (Yavuz, 1997: 30).  By providing an alternative discourse to the 
Kemalist elite, the religiously-oriented press greatly improved their daily 
circulation.
1
 Yavuz (1997) concluded that “as this pro-Islamic elite gradually 
continues to move into the higher echelons of the economy, cultural sphere, and 
bureaucracy, it will influence state policies” (Yavuz, 1997: 32).  
But for the time, the military reigned supreme because the death of Özal in 
1993 left a vacuum in Turkish politics which could not be filled. What followed 
was a succession of weak coalition governments. In the uncertainty of the post-
Cold War environment, the state elite and the Turkish Armed Forces, thanks to the 
institutional safe-guards, essentially dominated foreign policy.  While the Kemalist 
elite remained in charge, aligned itself with Israel. The Turkish elite see 
themselves as Europeans; Israelis also consider themselves as such.  A 
constructivist assessment of the situation reveals that both countries created a 
mutual image as secular, democratic, European nations (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003: 149-
153). It was natural then that these two countries, one of which sought EU 
membership,  and another which sought greater integration with Europe, would 
form a partnership. As Alan Makovsky (Pipes, 1997/1998) put it, "Turkish-Israeli 
relations have always been characterized by a shared ‘common sense of otherness’ 
in a region dominated by non-democratic, predominantly Arab states.” 
 
                                                 
1
 A marketshare increase from 7% in 1980 to a whopping 47% in 1996! 
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4.2.2. Institutions 
Starting with the 1960 coup, the Turkish Armed Forces (hereafter, “TAF”) 
began to exercise authority in civilian matters. Some of the lower echelons of the 
TAF, in conjunction with civilians who were fed up with the Democratic Party 
government, initiated a coup. The military had to "correct" the civilian 
government. The ensuing drama resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes and Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. This brought about an entirely 
new concern. The military was charged with modernizing and reforming Turkey. 
However, intervening in politics was perceived as retrograde and 
counterproductive – two officers who once again decided to undertake a coup in 
1962 was executed as well (Aydınlı, 2008: 697). The TAF was divided on how to 
liberalize but ensure security. They devised a new way to ensure a balance between 
the security of the regime and liberal reforms: A separate realm of “state” and 
“government” would simultaneously coexist where the former “guided” the latter 
(Aydınlı, 2008).   
After the 1960 coup, the new constitution introduced the Milli Güvenlik 
Kurulu (National Security Council – hereafter “NSC”) as a constitutionally 
mandated advisory body to the Council of Ministers. According to Article 188 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey: 
The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime 
Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of National 
Defense, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of 
the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of 
the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the 
Republic, Depending on the particulars of the Agenda, Ministers 
and other persons concerned may be invited to meetings of the 
Council and their views be heard. 
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It was not only “the embodiment of the bureaucracy’s primacy over the 
popularly elected parliament… it was designed to serve as a platform for the 
military to voice its own opinion on matters of national security” (Cizre, 1997: 
157).  In effect, it would ensure that a body of military officials could take part in 
the decision-making process at the highest echelons of government. A group of top 
level military officials and relevant government members (determined by the 
President or his interim, the Prime Minister) met every month to discuss security 
issues.  
The military continued to exercise strong influence over the body politic via 
constitutional arrangements that were setup in the period following the 1960 coup. 
In 1971, another coup, by memorandum, resulted in a governmental shuffle. The 
NSC’s power was further advanced and it could now make recommendations to 
the government (Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey): 
The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of 
Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary 
coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and 
implementation of the National Security policy of the State. 
However, the unending internal turmoil and near-civil war conditions 
culminated in the 1980 coup. At this juncture, according to Cizre (1997), the 
military not only wished to maintain its own independence from political structures 
in order to retain its professionalism and “institutional autonomy”, but it also 
wished to pursue its political agenda as well (Cizre, 1997: 152). However, to 
preserve a boundary between the military and civilian realm, and to disguise its 
political weight, the military needed to exercise its influence in a discrete manner 
(Cizre, 1997: 152). The power of the NSC was further increased in the 1982 
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constitution. According to the revised version of Article 118 of the 1982 
Constitution: 
The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the 
decisions of the National Security Council concerning the 
measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the 
existence and independence of the State, the integrity and 
indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society. 
Now the NSC’s recommendations carried greater weight than ever before. 
Furthermore, the “number and weight of senior commanders participating in the 
NSC also increased at the expense of civilian members” (Cizre, 1997: 158). 
A glance at Regulation 2945 regarding the National Security Council and 
the General Secretariat of the National Security Council shows that the NSC aimed 
to be involved in any and all matters that may pertain to the security of the country. 
Its duties included the protection of the constitutional order, national unity and 
integrity; and the protection of all political, social, cultural and economic interests 
of Turkey against external and internal threats. The NSC could also offer 
consultations as to when to declare a state of emergency or mobilization. With all 
of these developments, the NSC virtually became “the highest, non-elected, 
decision making body of the state” (Karabelias, 1998: 29). It had a profound 
influence on Turkish politics in the 1980s. In October 1982, many of the senior 
members of Turkey’s political parties were, at least temporarily, banned from 
participating in politics (Hale, 1994: 260). The TAF was also independent in its 
budget making. Furthermore, it also controlled its own Courts and oversaw the 
promotion of senior officers (i.e. dictated to the President of the Republic). The 
  
 
67 
 
NSC even established supervisory boards over some civilian institutions such as 
RTÜK (Campbell, 2009: 363). 
The dual nature of the Turkish state and their relative power had great 
implications for Turkey in the 1990s. While the weak coalition governments 
struggled with the day-to-day tasks of governing and carrying on with economic 
liberalization, EU membership and PKK terrorism, the Turkish Armed Forces, via 
its constitutionally mandated role, was able to set the political agenda and 
influence decision-making with regards to foreign policy.  The following section 
traces the origins of the privileged position of the TAF in the1990s and shows how 
the strong “state” undermined weak governments on issues such as Turkey’s 
relations with Israel.  
At the start of the decade, President Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party 
(ANAP), could afford to interfere in the succession of Chiefs of General Staff and 
display a more lax attitude towards Islamists and the Kurdish problem. However, 
as Cizre points out, these were neither profound policies aimed at limiting the 
power of the military nor could any one of Özal’s challenges be made possible 
without the tacit consent of the military (Cizre, 1997). Even the very man 
appointed by President Özal, Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay reminded people that 
the TAF will preserve Turkey’s “liberty, independence, and progress towards 
contemporary civilization”, which depends on the military’s safeguarding of “the 
secular and democratic features of the Turkish Republic … [and] defending the 
country against its internal and external enemies” (Heper & Güney, 1996: 629). In 
1990, the NSC issued the Milli Güvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi  or "National Security 
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Policy Document" (Çelenk, 2009: 121). The purpose of this document was to 
identify key threats to the state from both within and without. This document was 
revised in 1992 to include the danger of separatist activities, and again in 1997 to 
highlight the danger posed by religious fundamentalism and extremist ideologies 
(Çelenk, 2009: 121). The most notable aspect of this document was that it was it 
was unavailable for the public. The only civilians that could read the document 
were those that participated in the NSC meetings and even there they still could not 
make objections or propose revisions (Karabelias, 2003: 460). 
Following Turgut Özal's death, Turkey entered a period of political 
instability. Indeed, perhaps the most notorious aspect of Turkish politics during the 
1990s was the constant succession of weak coalition governments. This was 
complemented by militarization due to the post-Cold War conjuncture and, the 
continuing problem of the PKK, and the emergence of political Islam. In this 
period, “the Council of Ministers carried out all of the NSC’s resolutions,” which 
made the NSC “the institution that really runs the country" (Karabelias, 2003: 
460). In 1996, Necmettin Erbakan became the leader of a new coalition 
government. As a politician with an Islamic agenda, his presence provoked the ire 
of the TAF (Oğuzlu, 2010: 276). Ironically, the coalition was forged with DYP 
(True Path Party), whose leader, Tansu Çiller had earlier labelled Erbakan as the 
biggest threat to the secular order in Turkey and had also called on EU members to 
support Turkish accession as well as her policies so as to stave off conservative 
politicians such as Erbakan (Balcı, 1997) . On June 29 1996, Turkey and Israel 
signed a new military cooperation agreement with the aim of strengthening the 
cooperation of both military industries. Moreover, it aimed to modernize the 
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Turkish air force and the defunct F4 Phantoms under a 600 million USD deal to be 
carried out by the Israel Aircraft Industry. The agreement had actually been signed 
shortly before Erbakan came to power at the initiative of “the Turkish armed forces 
chiefs” at a time when there was effectively “no government in Turkey" (Hale, 
2002: 298). Erbakan prevaricated and called on his party members not to ratify the 
deal. Yet, under the pressure of the military he had to acquiesce in the following 
year (Kosebalaban, 2010). Yavuz (1997: 27) argues that the military did this in 
order to embarrass Erbakan, who had campaigned to end Turkey’s growing ties 
with Israel, in the eyes of his constituents. 
Nevertheless, Erbakan was not initially seen as a threat. For example, 
despite Erbakan's vitriolic statements towards Israel whilst in opposition, Israelis 
did not believe Erbakan could seriously harm Turkish-Israeli relations 
(Cumhuriyet, 1996c). In an interview, Israel's ambassador to Ankara, Zvi Elpeleg, 
reasoned that the Turkish military favored the Turkish-Israeli partnership and 
because Erbakan needed the approval of the military he could not reverse the 
course of relations (Cumhuriyet, 1996e). Indeed, Erbakan appears to have taken a 
more pragmatic stance on foreign policy matters. "We are no longer in 
opposition... we cannot afford to alienate our [coalition partner]," declared Erbakan 
(Cumhuriyet, 1996e), signaling a willingness to compromise on such issues as 
"Çekiç Güç" (the allied force resposible for the enforcement of the no-fly zone 
over Iraq) and relations with Islamic countries. He further stated his willingness to 
work with the military on matters of foreign policy, stating that “we will take 
action after consulting with the commanders of our heroic military" (Cumhuriyet, 
1996e). As it turned out, the NSC elected to extend the duration of Çekiç-Güç 
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(Cumhuriyet, 1996d). Aside from this demonstration of influence of the military in 
foreign policy-making, these developments show that Erbakan's words are not 
without cynicism. Erbakan implicitly recognized that articulating extremist policies 
can attract votes but the political realities prohibit these from reaching fruition.     
Turkey was ruled by a coalition government led by Erbakan, but it also 
featured Tansu Çiller (and the TAF). The “three-headed foreign policy” divided 
each issue-area among these actors (Kosebalaban, 2010:42). While Çiller was 
responsible for relations with the EU, Erbakan took it upon himself to approach 
Iran and various other Muslim countries. This was tragically expressed by Çiller 
who boasted that she was "in charge of Turkey's foreign policy" - a statement lost 
on the prime minister who, unbeknownst to Çiller, carried out diplomatic talks 
with Syria (Balcı, 1996). Also unaware of the situation was the Minister of State, 
Abdullah Gül, who maintained that the treaties with Israel could be revised (Balcı, 
1996). In the absence of any coherence or consistency the military establishment 
monopolized relations with Israel - meaning that the government also had to follow 
the military's lead. For example, Erbakan had to concede to ratifying a new trade 
agreement on January 1st 1997. 
However, the inability of the government to articulate a coherent foreign 
policy was the least of its worries as the REFAHYOL government was constantly 
in danger of receiving a vote of no-confidence - no doubt aggravated by 
accusations of nepotism and perceived threats to the secular order (Cumhuriyet, 
1996f; 1996g). However, nothing could compare to the events of February 1997. 
On the 3rd of February, an anti-Israel demonstration (Jerusalem Nights) was held 
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in the Sincan district of Ankara at the behest of the municipality mayor Bekir 
Yıldız of the Welfare Party. Muhammed Rıza Bagheri, the Iranian ambassador to 
Ankara was also among the antendents and made controversial statements on 
matters of religion and secularism (Cumhuriyet, 1997a). A group of CHP MPs who 
had decided to distribute Atatürk pins in Sincan were attacked (Cumhuriyet, 
1997c). Finally, a second meeting took place in Ankara's Center for Iranian 
Culture. As it transpired, the materials for both meetings had been obtained from 
the Iranian government (Cumhuriyet, 1997c). This was the final straw. On 
February 4
th, “the army rolled tanks down the main street of Sincan during the 
morning rush hour" (Hale, 2004: 298, 318). Coincidentally, some of these tanks 
happened to breakdown at the very location the meeting was held. Chief of Staff 
Ismail Hakkı Karadayı (Cumhuriyet, 1997d) explained "in view of the recent 
practices the government is undermining its legitimacy" and declared that the 
events in Sincan "undermined the values of [our] country." Furthermore, he 
continued, "the institutions responsible for stopping such policies have to fulfill 
their duties," and so the government had to fall (Cumhuriyet, , 1997d). Opposition 
parties were already preparing to call for a vote of no-confidence (Cumhuriyet, 
1997e). The State Security Courts ("DGM" hereafter were the predecessor of 
today's ad hoc courts) immediately took action resulting in the arrest of mayor 
Bekir Yıldız (Hale, 2004: 298, 318). Simultaneously, the Iranian ambassador, 
whom ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz called a terrorist, was declared persona non 
grata (Cumhuriyet, 1997f). Daniel Pipes (1997/1998) observes: 
All this is quite stunning. A town virtually occupied for celebrating 
Jerusalem Day? A mayor arrested and pushed out of his job for anti-Israel 
remarks? A diplomatic row over an ambassador's anti-Zionism? In the 
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Middle East in 1997 this could only take place in Turkey, the one Muslim 
country where a powerful institution completely rejects the demonization of 
Israel and instead fosters a hard kernel of pro-Israel sentiment.   
In the same month, a Turkish delegation, which featured prominent names 
such as the Minister of State Abdullah Gül, Onur Öymen the Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Çevik Bir, Vice-Chief of Staff, arrived in 
Washington to discuss bilateral relations and outstanding issues. Although the US 
government choose to maintain its distance towards the Turkish government, US 
officials nevertheless witnessed the domestic debates within Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 
1997h). Çevik Bir's declarations in Washington regarding the role and duties of 
TAF as the custodian of secularism and democracy  was perceived as a thinly-
veiled threat to the REFAHYOL government (Cumhuriyet, 1997h). Opposition 
parties, the General Staff and a variety of actors expressed their support. For Mesut 
Yılmaz (Cumhuriyet, 1997i), the sentiment was also shared by Turkish society. On 
the other, Hasan Celal Güzel, leader of the YDP (Rebirth Party) condemned Bir 
for his comments regarding the undertaking of "a balancing act to [Turkish] 
democracy" as well as his role in the procession of tanks across Sincan two weeks 
earlier (Cumhuriyet, 1997i).  
Meanwhile Erbakan’s visits to various Muslim countries had culminated in 
a gas deal with Iran; the very country which Chief of Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayı 
(Cumhuriyet, 1997j) criticized during his visit to Israel. Of course, the military had 
the initiative in foreign policy (Sarıibrahimoğlu, 1997a). 
  In midst of all of this tension and confusion the NSC convened on the 
28th of February - the agenda was the Turkish regime (Cumhuriyet, 1997k). The 
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meeting that took place on this fateful Friday set about the eventual downfall of 
the REFAHYOL government. The TAF issued a  series of demands on Erbakan 
through the NSC. Undetered by Erbakan's criticism of "secular fascism" the 
Council identified irtica as a primary threat (Cumhuriyet,  1997l). The military 
impressed on Erbakan the gravity of the situation and "recommended" that religion 
no longer be exploited for political ends. Furthermore, not only should the 
government keep tabs on suspected Islamists but such officials at various echelons 
of the Turkish administrative system should be purged. These were followed by a 
second series of demands were in the same tune. Regardless, accepting them 
would have amounted to political suicide (Aydınlı, 2010: 228). 
Turkey’s gradual establishment and deepening of its ties with Israel and the 
February 28 (1997) Process should provide abundant evidence for the 
overwhelming political power of the Turkish military during the middle and late 
1990s. Furthermore, the active role taken by the military in initiating or ending 
foreign policy crises and its assumption of the responsibilities of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on some matters was deemed to be normal in this period (Özcan, 
2010).  
4.2.3.Civil Society  
The state did not simply coerce Erbakan by declarations alone. It exercised 
its influence through a variety of civilian channels. The TAF  was able to exert its 
will by mobilizing various groups within “the media, higher education, the 
business chambers, unions and even politicians, to block the existing government 
from power” (Aydınlı, 2007: 228). 
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While the literature review failed to identify relevant works on civil society 
and international alliance, it would be remiss to ignore civil society actors in the 
domestic scene of Turkey in the 1990s. The 1980 military intervention had 
reaffirmed the authority of the state over Turkish society. But as of 1983, Turkey 
had begun a transition to a liberal economy. With the advent of the 'neoliberal age' 
in Turkey, non-state actors in Turkey also began to bloom (Şimşek, 2004: 48). 
That said, Turkey's civil society was free and influential insofar as the interests of 
organizations were in accordance with that of the Turkish state, i.e. Turkey's elites 
(Karaman & Aras,2000: 40). In this regard, TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialist and 
Businessmen’s Association) wielded the most influence as it represented the 
"Kemalist, oligarchic national bourgeoisie" (Burak, 2011: 63). Its constituents had 
ties to the Turkish state elite and advocated a pro-EU, pro-Western agenda. 
While the liberalization of the economy began to empower new segments of 
the society, the interactions between the emerging civil society and the "hard state" 
were not entirely harmonious. The liberalization of the economy, among other 
things, also led to the rise of the "Anatolian bourgeoisie" and a myriad of civil 
society organizations that opposed the state elites of Turkey (Burak, 2011: 63-64). 
For example MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) 
was setup in 1990 to bring together and articulate the interests of Islamic 
businessmen of small and medium-sized enterprises. It was possible to speak of an 
emerging Islamic capital as an economic force in Turkey. Already discredited 
because of the 1980 coup, the state elites and military came under increasing 
criticism from these emerging actors. The effect was that Turkey's nascent civil 
society was a part of the Islamist-secularist binary. Business associations and labor 
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unions participated in the political drama of Turkey. When Erbakan found 
widespread public support and emerged as prime minister in 1996, he provoked 
secularist civil society actors to work in tandem with the military. Public discourse 
sided with the army as concerns over the integrity of the secular regime manifested 
thanks to the efforts of the civilian components of the statist elite. Thus came into 
being the "Civil Initiative of the Five," comprised of employer and trade unions such 
as DISK, TESK, TISK, TOBB and Türk-Iş which pressured the government 
(Karaaman & Aras, 2000: 54-55). In the aftermath of the meetings in early February 
1997 Türk-Iş, TISK and ADD (Ataturkist Thought Association) were particularly 
vociferous in their protests as they alluded to the Sivas massacre years before. They 
declared that the attendees, if given the chance, would surely burn people like they 
did in Sivas. Absent from this cartel was the Hak-İşlabor confederation as it deemed 
the movement to be a form of social engineering initiated by the NSC (Duran & 
Yıldırım, 2005: 241). In June 1997, Erbakan resigned.  
In the aftermath of this 'post-modern coup,' in which Turkey's civil society 
partook, Islamic foundations were closed down, Islamic capital boycotted, and it 
seemed as though civil society was not yet free. In 2001, Erbakan's Welfare Party 
was officially closed down by order of the Constitutional Court. Turkey resumed its 
activities to become an EU-member and, in the meantime the TAF continued its 
presence in foreign policy. In September 1998, Army Commander General Atilla 
Ateş issued a warning to Syria that continuing to harbor PKK terrorists and 
Abdullah Öcalan would have consequences (Özcan, 2010: 28-29). Syria soon 
yielded and once again the TAF had a decisive impact on Turkey’s foreign relations.  
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3. 5. Conclusion: The National Interest in the 1990s 
 
As discussed earlier, there were structural justifications for the Turkish-Israeli 
alliance. Yet, there is evidence that suggests that the alliance with Israel was directed 
towards achieving domestic goals. The implication is that while the sudden break-
down of relations with Israel, the subject of our study, was thought to be unusual, it 
now seems that the decision to align with Israel may have been a form of 
maladaptive behavior as state-level concerns seem to have had a more decisive 
influence than purely system-level ones. While there are some valid structural 
imperatives, it seems that Turkey was not solely motivated by the balance of power 
or other structural concerns. In fact, there is no clear delineation between foreign 
threats and domestic ones. That said, Turkey’s foreign policy was largely consistent 
with traditional theories of alliance behavior.   
  In this period, Turkey's old elites were beginning to lose power but 
institutional arrangements relating to the role of the Turkish military prevented the 
still nascent Islamist elites from pursuing an independent foreign policy. Instead, 
political Islam and Kurdish separatism were securitized as threats to the 
Republican order.  In a period of political fragmentation which saw the quick 
succession of weak coalition governments, the TAF dominated the political scene. 
The 1990s may be regarded as the golden age of the Armed Forces' involvement in 
domestic and foreign affairs (Uzgel, 2003 :178).  
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What was the context in which Turkey's national interest favored an 
alignment with Israel? There were pressures for economic freedom and political 
liberalism emanating from Turkey’s neighborhood (notably through EU), these had 
the potential to undermine the statist elites and Republican regime because they 
promoted new elites. Any successes by Islamists and Kurdish separatists would 
have undermined Turkey's secular, Western, identity and weaken the role of the 
military. This, of course, had consequences. Aras writes: 
The discourse of the foreign policy elite tends to dramatize threats originating 
from imaginary or real enemies because it needs to renew itself or establish 
legitimacy in domestic affairs. Of course, even though the perceived threats to 
national interest might not be totally imaginary, they constitute material that 
can be manipulated by the administrative elites, with the threat frequently 
exaggerated.. [the] natural outcome of this situation is that foreign policy 
becomes an extension of domestic politics and suffers under this yoke (Aras, 
2000).  
In this case, Turkey's statist elite needed to discredit Islamists, balance 
domestic terrorism, and reinforce its western identity. The establishment of an 
alliance with Israel can be seen within this context. An alliance with Israel 
prevented the projects of the emerging elites from reaching fruition. The alliance 
with Israel not only humiliated the Islamists to whom Israel was anathema but it 
may have indeed been used as a device to discredit a pro-Islamic prime minister, 
Necmettin Erbakan. Regardless, the Turkish-Israeli alliance is portrayed as one 
having strategic imperatives and benefits (Bir & Sherman, 2002). In reality one can 
interpret the event as: 
Structural imperatives for change  domestic threats to values  Alignment with Israel  
such as globalization and EU      and elite status 
pressures  
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In light of the above interpretation, it is possible that a reversal of the 
domestic situation; that is, the breakdown of the traditional military-dominated 
system and the attainment by civilian politicians greater influence in the discharge of 
governmental functions, could result in a vastly different foreign policy in both 
aims, style, and execution. This is subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE CIVILIAN ADJUSTMENT: DEMOCRATIZATION, AND 
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH-ISRAELI 
ALLIANCE 
 
 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
 
At the dawn of the new millennium, Turkey’s foreign policy was geared towards EU 
membership; the Turkish military and civilian politicians were united in their 
commitment to achieving this end. This naturally entailed a greater awareness of 
Turkey's domestic problems as well as its chronic foreign policy problems with 
Cyprus and Greece. Although efforts to solve the Cyprus issue were ultimately 
unsuccessful, Turkey showed willingness to compromise. Turkey's relations with 
Arab countries and its interactions with neighbors were now conducted with greater 
amicability. This suggests that Turkey's foreign policy also underwent fundamental 
changes. Whereas Turkey once employed "coercive diplomacy," it began to adopt a 
softer approach in its foreign policy (Kirişçi, 2009: 34).  However, these positive 
developments were accompanied with wildly unexpected developments: the decline 
and collapse of the Turkish-Israeli partnership. It is true that Turkish-Israeli relations 
have fluctuated over the decades, but the abruptness and severity in which relations 
have ended requires further deliberation.  
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For all the periods of disenchantment, crises, and poor relations, Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards the West, its orientation, has remained remarkably consistent 
since the end of the Second World War. In fact, one could suggest this as something 
close to a law in international relations as Levy (1988) did for the democratic peace. 
Turkey’s alignment with Israel has been seen in a similar light – as two non-Arab 
democracies in the region with close security establishments. Efraim Inbar (2010: 1) 
sums up the situation: 
For Jerusalem, the intimacy between the two governments was 
second only to US-Israel relations. A strategic partnership between 
Ankara and Jerusalem emerged, which was reinforced by a common 
strategic agenda based on similar concerns about Syria, Iraq and 
Iran, and complementary interests in central Asia. The two states 
also displayed a similar outlook on global affairs, including foreign 
policy alignment with the US… The Israeli-Turkish entente became 
an important feature of post-Cold War politics in the Middle East. 
 
Fast forwarding to the end of the decade, the situation is vastly different. Of 
course, Turkey retains its strategic partnership with the US and its activism in 
international institutions. However, the Turkish-Israeli partnership is no more. In 
fact, relations have been downgraded, military cooperation ended and relations have 
virtually been severed. One decade after the honeymoon, Turkish-Israeli relations 
are now at their nadir. A part of the reason obviously has to do with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Turkey has expressed its concerns and went so far as to condemn Israel on 
various occasions. However, throughout most of its history, Turkish leaders have 
refrained from taking sides with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is no 
longer the case. Turkey and Israel have been at odds since 2008 and experienced 
numerous crises in their relations as leaders on both sides have lashed out at each 
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other. The Flotilla Incident in May 2010 was an entirely new era in Turkish foreign 
policy and its relations with Israel. The sharp turn in Turkish-Israeli relations, 
combined with Turkey’s foreign policy activism in its neighborhood and especially 
the Arab world, have even led to questions about Turkey’s basic orientation (Inbar, 
2010: 29-30).  
The new millennium did not initially witness any unpleasantness in the 
Turkish-Israeli alliance. Military cooperation remained and trade relations continued 
to develop. The election of the AKP was met with unease in Jerusalem, but relations 
continued on their normal trajectory (Inbar, 2010: 30). Turkey even acted as a 
facilitator between Israel and Syria to work out a solution to their territorial disputes. 
These efforts did not result in anything productive as Israel’s main foreign policy 
concern at the time was Iran (Aytürk, 2010). The US-led invasion of Iraq stirred up 
some troubling issues though. Israel’s support for the endeavor, in lieu of Israel’s 
close ties with the US, was not met well by the Turkish public (Kosebalaban, 2010: 
37). Furthermore, Israel’s interest in Northern Iraq roused public suspicions of 
Israeli complicity in PKK activities. This, combined with Israel’s assassination of 
Hamas leader Skiekh Ahmed Yassin, and his successor Abdulaziz al-Rantisi, led to 
protests in Turkey – in fact, Prime Minister Erdoğan went so far as to call Israel a 
terrorist state (Alpay, January 5 2009).   
In February 2006, the Turkish government hosted a Hamas delegation in 
Ankara, to the displeasure of the Israeli government. Abdullah Gül, then Foreign 
Minister, received Hamas leader Mashal. While the Economist (April 1 2006) has 
labeled this as “chasing votes," it is clear that the Israeli government and Jewish 
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groups were perturbed (Turkish Daily News, February 25 2006). Relations took yet 
another hit early in 2008 as the IDF initiated a blockade on Gaza. For example, tens 
of thousands of protestors gathered in the Çağlayan Square in Istanbul to 
demonstrate against Israel. Erdoğan said that "Israel will drown in the tears of Gaza" 
(Anadolu Agency, January 5 2008). 
The real decline in the relations began in December 2008 when the IDF 
initiated Operation Cast Lead against Hamas presence in the Gaza Strip. The 
operation, which resulted in many civilian casualties, was harshly criticized by the 
Turkish government. Drawing attention to Olmert's pledge to continue talks with 
Syria and in view of Turkey's past efforts to facilitate talks, Erdoğan (DIA declared, 
"this operation, launched despite all of these facts, also show disrespect to Turkey" 
(DIA, 2008). 
The following month, in what became a major highlight of the 2009 Davos 
World Economic Forum, Erdoğan harshly criticized Israel, declaring that Israelis 
"knew how to murder well" and stormed out during the debate with Israeli President 
Peres.  
President Peres you are older than me and your voice is very loud. The 
reason for you raising your voice isthe psychology of guilt. I will not 
raise my voice that much, you should know that. When it comes to 
killing youknow very well how to kill. I know very well how you hit and 
killed children on the beaches. 
 
Moreover, Erdoğan (de Bendern, January 30 2009) justified his words, 
saying  that "This was a matter of the esteem and prestige of my country. Hence, my 
reaction had to be clear. I could not have allowed anyone to poison the prestige and 
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in particular the honor of my country” (de Bendern, January 30 2009). Was such a 
display made for winning the hearts and minds of regional neighbors; winning votes; 
or simply a manifestation of personal convictions? Perhaps it was a bit of each, as 
Erdoğan’s outburst was widely praised in the Arab world. Erdoğan returned to 
Turkey and received a hero’s welcome as he was cheered on by large crowds 
(Economist, 2009a).  
Relations continued to decline as Israel’s participation in the “Anatolian 
Eagle” air exercise was cancelled in October 2009. The Turkish public and media let 
their intentions be known. The airing of an anti-Israeli drama series on TRT also 
added to the tension. In January 2010, another crisis took place. During a meeting, 
the Turkish ambassador was engineered to sit on a lower chair as a way of 
humiliating Turkey. The final blow to the relationship came in June 2010 when a 
ship, the Mavi Marmara, full of activists bound for the Gaza Strip was intercepted 
by the IDF. In the ensuing struggle, nine Turkish citizens lost their lives. The events 
led to a UN investigation of the case.  
In September 2011, displeased by the outcome of the investigation, and with 
no Israeli apology in sight, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador to Ankara and 
relations were downgraded. Turkey has stated that an apology is needed before 
normal relations can resume. Most recently, some have speculated that Turkey will 
host and provide funds for Hamas (Bar'el, 2012); Turkey has denied these claims 
(Kujawa, 2012).  
What happened to Turkey's consistent - predictable, even - foreign policy? 
What about Turkey or its international situation is different than it was in the 1990s? 
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Turkey’s international relations are not fundamentally different from the 1990s. 
Granted, Turkey’s relations did, at least temporarily, improve. The US-led invasion 
of Iraq and the power vacuum left by Saddam was and still is a cause for concern. 
This of course has implications for Turkey’s Kurdish problem and the PKK, both of 
which remain as important issues in the political agenda. It appears that there were 
no significant changes in Turkey’s surroundings when the deterioration first began 
but in the way neighbors, former threats, and regional problems are perceived by 
Turkey. Specifically, how and why did Turkey being to view Israel as a source of 
instability in the region when in fact they were once partners in crime, so to speak?   
The previous chapter saw the struggle between Turkey’s military-
bureaucratic elite which often clashed with weak governments. Indeed, the 1990s 
was associated with numerous coalition governments that often competed with the 
military but failed to exercise its independent will. Although a variety of 
governments and leaders guided Turkey through these times, it seemed that the 
military always had the final say in the realm of foreign policy. Nowhere was this 
more apparent than in the Turkish-Israeli alignment and indeed in the military’s 
increasingly tighter grip on domestic affairs as well. This alignment, as well as other 
policies, can therefore be attributed to the dual governance structure elaborated in 
the previous chapter (Aydınlı, 2010).     
This chapter will deal with Turkey in the new millennium and under the 
AKP. After a system-level assessment of Turkey's international relations, including 
the distribution of capabilities and threat perceptions the chapter will return to state-
level arguments. As neither the Kurdish issue has subsided and Turkey has not gone 
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a regime change, there is reason to believe that changes in Turkey's behavior 
towards Israel is a result of changes in Turkey's domestic balance of power. The 
focus of this chapter will thus be on the changes in this bifurcated system and how 
this has affected Turkey’s foreign relations. The erosion of the power of the security 
establishment and its supporters in the old elites has led to the emergence of civilian 
leaders, societal groups, and new elites as the new makers of Turkish foreign policy. 
As reflected in the changes to Turkey’s National Security Document in 2010, 
Turkey no longer views its former antagonists as threats. Instead, Turkey views its 
former ally as a source of instability in its region, resulting in antagonistic relations 
(Kosebalaban, 2010: 38). 
Based on the layout advanced in the previous chapter, the next section will 
deal with system-level phenomena that could have affected Turkey’s relations with 
Israel. A comprehensive analysis of the crumbling dual governance structure, 
including legal amendments, arrests of high ranking military officials, and public 
gestures will follow in the section on the state-level. The chapter will also refer to 
the PKK problem as well the impact of new elites and other societal actors in 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Finally, Turkish-Israeli relations in the past decade will be 
explored, identifying linkages between Turkey’s new internal power structure with 
foreign policy.  
4. 2.Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the AKP 
 
The task of understanding the decline of the alliance requires an understanding of 
the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy. The previous section highlighted the 
  
 
86 
 
increasing importance of soft power in Turkish foreign policy in the AKP period. 
Other characteristics include a broadening in the scope of interactions and an 
emphasis on non-military issues, activism in regional affairs, promotion of regional 
stability through mediatory roles, and a commitment to zero-problems with 
neighbors (Davutoğlu, 2006). These developments are echoed in Turkey’s domestic 
politics and even in the execution of military operations (Kirişçi, 2009: 29). For 
example, during the high tide of the military’s influence, military operations against 
PKK elements in Northern Iraq could proceed without parliamentary debate and 
would barely register in the public agenda (Kirişçi, 2009: 31). In contrast a similar 
operation in 2008 was undertaken with parliamentary consent and in the backdrop of 
spirited public dialogue and active diplomatic exchanges with the Kurdish Regional 
Government of Iraq (Kirişçi, 2009: 32). In short, the ‘regional coercive power’ 
became a soft-power (Kirişçi, 2009: 32).  
Nevertheless, the disposition of Turkey’s foreign policy was heterogeneous 
even in the AKP period as Turkey’s relations with Israel were smooth until 2007. 
Ziya Öniş identifies areas in which, despite some continuity, Turkey’s foreign 
policy has undergone changes (ruptures) after the 2007 elections (Öniş, 2011; 
Altunışık & Martin, 2011). For our purposes, foreign policy style, style of 
mediation, leadership of foreign policy and linkages between foreign and domestic 
politics are most relevant. Turkey’s foreign policy is much more assertive and 
conducted independently of allies. This can clearly be observed in the changes of 
negotiation/mediation style as well. Although Turkey ostensibly favors zero 
problems with neighbors and impartiality in regional conflicts (a principle that 
dates back to the previous century), the practical results are very different. For 
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example, Turkey clearly took sides in the Iran Nuclear-swap negotiations. 
Furthermore, whereas Turkey once attempted to facilitate talks between Syria and 
Israel, and between Palestinians and Israel, Turkey has clearly taken a pro-
Palestinian position in the dispute. Furthermore the arrival of an energetic Foreign 
Minister has led to “stronger leadership and ownership” of foreign policy (Öniş, 
2011: 51). Finally, while civil society participation has become more important in 
the formulation of foreign policy, the AKP government is more willing to use 
foreign policy for strengthening its domestic base.  
Similarly, Altunışık and Martin (2011: 570) highlight the changes and 
continuity in the foreign policy of Turkey using the definitions of foreign policy 
change by Charles Hermann. There are four aspects of change including 
adjustment change (level of effort), program change (method), goals, and 
international orientation. The first two can easily be observed in the changing 
scope and intensity of Turkish foreign policy. As for the latter two, Turkey under 
the AKP continues on a tradition of attempting to maintain regional stability and 
peace but its methods are different. More importantly is the matter of linking 
foreign policy for domestic ends. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the 
military bureaucratic establishment favored the establishment of secular alliances 
with such countries as Israel to balance internal threats. The AKP has also done 
this. It promoted economic relations with its neighborhood in order to promote the 
welfare of some of its core constituents such as the emerging Anatolian 
bourgeoisie (Altunışık & Martin, 2011: 572). Similarly, displaying an anti-Israeli 
disposition and elevating crises with Israel was a means of discrediting the 
military establishment of Turkey (Altunışık & Martin, 2011: 572).   
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4. 3. System-Level Factors 
 
Having discussed the various aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy in the AKP period 
above, we must now scrutinize the system-level factors that may have affected, if at 
all, the Turkish-Israeli alliance.  
As far as power, material capabilities, and power aggregation are concerned, 
available data (until 2007) from the COW database does not suggest any reasons 
for why the Turkish-Israeli partnership would collapse.  
Table 3. Changes in Distribution of Capabilities (percent of world share) in selected countries 
(Singer, 1987) 
 
After the financial crisis of 2001, Turkey's share in world capabilities began 
to improve, while Iraq's capabilities after the US-led invasion in 2003 reached its 
nadir. One notable feature of the distribution of capabilities is the meteoric rise of 
Iranian capabilities. In view of Iran’s nuclear aspirations and world opinion levied 
against it, it comes as a surprise that the Turkish-Israeli alliance, despite the 
structural incentive, collapsed. It would seem that the relative growth in Iranian 
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power was a not a sufficient condition for continued Turkish-Israeli cooperation. 
On the other hand, Turkey has transformed from a coercive power to one that 
practices soft power – perhaps capabilities no longer matter? Israel was an 
important source for military hardware for Turkey, but coercion is no longer in the 
repertoire of Turkish foreign policy (Oğuzlu, 2010: 282).  
Moving on to threat perception, Turkey no longer perceives its neighbors as 
existential dangers. In the AKP period, Turkey's disposition toward Iran has 
become more cordial (Aras & Polat, 2008). Iran has become an important energy 
supplier for Turkey with its considerable reserves of gas and oil (Kalaycıoğlu, 
2011: 282). However, Iran still remains in the Red Book, a state document 
produced by the NSC that articulates threats to Turkey. On the other hand, Israel 
perceives Iran as an existential threat. (Aytürk, 2010) Similarly, Turkey’s relations 
with Syria improved throughout the decade to the point that visa restrictions 
between the two countries were removed in 2008. Finally, there is the matter of 
Iraq. Without doubt, the most dramatic change in Turkey’s neighborhood was the 
US-led invasion of Iraq. The failure of Turkey and US to reach an understanding 
merits further discussion. The decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
on 1 March 2003 denying US forces access to bases on Turkish soil essentially left 
Turkey without any leverage in Iraq. The consequent consolidation of a Kurdish 
Regional Government in Northern Iraq and the initial failure of US and Turkey to 
share intelligence on PKK activities further compounded difficulties. The rise of a 
possible Kurdish state, which Turkey adamantly opposes, also meant for Israel 
another non-Arab ally in the region with which to cooperate (Kibaroğlu, 2005).  
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Further structural arguments would point to Turkey’s improved relations 
with its broader neighborhood. Turkey no longer feels isolated from Europe as it 
did in the 1990s thanks to improved relations. At the same time, Arab countries 
have become an important source of foreign direct investment and trade. As such, 
continued strategic cooperation, especially in the face of gratuitous acts violence 
by Israel against Palestinians, would have prevented in the development of 
stronger economic ties (Oğuzlu, 2010: 283-284).  
These structural arguments were made in response to arguments that 
attributed to the decline of the alliance due to domestic reasons clashing identities 
and religious values. However, Oğuzlu notes that the Turkish-Israeli alliance is not 
a proper alliance and that it never had the organic elements, such as trade 
interdependence or societal approval, to make it an enduring alliance (Oğuzlu, 
2010: 276). It was supported only by Turkey’s military establishment and could 
not sustain itself absent structural imperatives (Bengio, 2004). Based solely on the 
distribution of capabilities, a Turkish-Israeli alliance against Iran makes greater 
sense today than it did in the 1990s when Iran was still recovering from the Iran-
Iraq War.  
Nevertheless, these structural arguments do not account for Turkey’s new 
perspective on its neighborhood. Moreover, the intensity and abruptness with 
which Turkish-Israeli relations declined suggests that structural reasons alone 
cannot explain the story. Furthermore, not perceiving neighboring countries as 
threats and increasing trade relations would require an ideational change. 
Specifically, a weakening of Turkey’s military in affecting foreign policy and a 
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concomitant desecuritization of former (domestic and external) threats could 
account for Turkey’s behavior towards Israel (Aras & Polat, 2008). As with the 
case of Iran, much of Turkey’s threat perception is an externalization of domestic 
fears about the security of the secular republican order (Aras & Polat, 2008: 506; 
Kosebalaban, 2010: 46).  
 
 
4. 4. State-Level 
 
4. 4. 1 Domestic Threats:Omnibalancing? 
 
As was the case in the 1990s, the PKK remains a potent force affecting Turkey.  By 
the end of the 1990s, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was caught. At the 
high tide of the military’s power, the PKK had ceased its activities. However, this 
organization came back with a vengeance during the AKP period. One implication 
for the revival, or continuation, of PKK terrorism was that their persistence 
suggested that a purely hard security based approach was not sufficient to tackle the 
issue (Özcan, 2010). This prompted the government to take charge of the affair. 
Aside from cooperation by NGOs, the much vaunted ‘Democratic Opening’ was 
initiated under the auspices of the AKP government even though PKK terrorism is 
still deemed to be the biggest threat to Turkey (see: Revised National Security 
Document Approved by Turkish Cabinet).   
In light of the persistence of such a security problem it is difficult to 
imagine that the Turkish-Israeli alliance would end. Granted, the PKK was of 
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peripheral interest in their bilateral relations. Far more interesting is the matter of 
“irtica” or religious fundamentalists and aspiring political Islamist groups. 
According to the National Security Documents of the previous decade, specifically 
the 1997 version, these groups were deemed as threats to the survival of the 
Turkish state along with ideological extremists from both sides of the political 
spectrum - Greece and Syria were the external threats that made the list (Çelenk, 
2009: 120).  This is no longer the case as religious threats have increasingly been 
deemphasized in succeeding NSC Red Books (most notably in the 2010 version. 
Recalling from the previous chapter that a major reason for the Turkish-Alliance 
was the secular establishment’s desire to “balance” the rising tide of religious 
fundamentalism, it can be inferred that the de-emphasis of religious groups as a 
threat would lower the utility of Israel as an ally against a domestic threat (Yavuz, 
1997; Altunışık & Martin, 2011). However, such a change can only be explained 
through a change in the secular establishment or the weakening of its main 
components, such as the military. 
 
 
4. 4. 2. Turkey’s New Elites  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Turkey has witnessed the steady emergence of a 
new elite since the 1970s. In the aftermath of the 28th February Coup, the Welfare 
Party closed and replaced by the the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) under the 
leadership of Recai Kutan. The party failed to emulate the success of its predecessor 
and was split in two amidst the confusion caused by discussions over the future 
direction of the party. 
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While the traditionalists went to create the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)The 
reformist elements within the party coalesced to form the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
(Justice and Development Party or AKP hereafter).This party went on to win the 
general elections in November 2002 and establish itself as single party government; 
a first in many years.  In the by-election the following year, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
the former mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, became prime Minister. 
Erdoğan was a controversial figure and had served time in jail for anti-secular 
remarks. He is known to have said that "democracy is not an end, but a means'"; 
"one cannot be both Muslim and secular" (Demirel, 2004: 189-191); "they [the 
statist elite] claim that secularism is being destroyed; of course, it will be destroyed 
if the nation so wishes it; you cannot prevent it" (Demirel, 2004: 194). However, the 
party is said to have taken on a moderate stance on these issues, which has led some 
scholars to label them as "Islamic liberals" or "strategic modernists" who wish to 
promote religious freedoms (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 9). On the other hand many of 
its members have studied in Imam-Hatip Schools and can be said to be religious 
conservatives (Sayari & Hasanov, 2008). Oliver Roy has likened the AKP to the 
Christian Democrat Parties found in various European countries (Roy, 2004). In any 
case, the Party’s position is one that is opposed to the statist elite and its ‘mission to 
civilize’ Turkish society. In this the AKP has been remarkably successful in 
critiquing the old establishment and putting controversial issues on the agenda. It 
was also successful in gaining allies across a wide range of networks including 
intellectuals, businessmen and bureaucrats. However, the election of the AKP 
exacerbated the religious-secularist, old-elite vs. new elite, conflict in Turkey. As 
such the first term of the AKP featured a violent clash between the old establishment 
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and the AKP. In this period, Turkey’s foreign policy was geared towards EU 
membership but otherwise calm. After the second electoral victory, the AKP can be 
said to have gained the upper hand over the military. Turkish foreign policy in this 
period was more assertive and pro-active. It also coincides with Abdullah Gül, a key 
player in both the REFAHYOL government and the first AKP government in which 
he served as the Minister of Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs respectively, 
becoming the head of state in 2007.  
In addition to Erdoğan, former foreign minister and president, Abdullah Gül, 
along with Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s current foreign minister, can be said to 
form a triumvirate in Turkish foreign policy-making (Bağcı, 2006) 
He is the brain-child of Turkey’s foreign policy. Dautoğlu's (2006) magnum 
opus, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position,” reveals the principles of 
Turkey’s foreign policy. Owing to its geopolitical disposition, Turkey should pursue 
an active foreign policy, assume leadership, of multiple regions (basins). To achieve 
this, Turkey ought to amicably solve its chronic domestic problems such as the 
Kurdish issue – despite positive efforts in this direction, the PKK problem persists. 
It is fair to speak of a desecuritization of the Kurdish issue. The external component 
requires solving outstanding problems with neighbors. Improving relations and 
stabilizing borders would enable Turkey to conduct foreign policy more efficiently 
on multiple fronts: this is the underlying principle behind the ‘zero problems with 
neighbors policy.’ But these seemingly realist ideas are to be conducted with soft 
power principles in mind. The scope of relations will cover such areas as economic 
links and the common history, common cultural values, which Turkey shares in its 
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greater neighborhood. Many of these principles were present in the AKP's election 
manifestos (Yanık, 2012: 217).  
Crossing over the theory-praxis line, Turkey’s “zero problems with 
neighbors policy” (zpwn) has not been entirely successful. Given the failure of talks 
with Armenia, and Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel and Syria, some have 
labeled Turkey’s foreign policy as “all azimuth hostility” (Karmon, 2011). Why did 
Turkey do this? How did Israel go from being an essential partner to a “terrorist 
state?”  
However, Turkey’s elites are not confined to political parties or ministries.  
Turkey’s new elite is composed of businessmen, the aforementioned ‘Anatolian 
Tigers’ in the previous chapter, sections of the press, and non-state organizations. 
Indeed, Turkey has in recent years witnessed a proliferation of think tanks such as 
SETA and TASAM as well as business associations like TUSKON that share close 
connections with the government; all of which more will be said later. 
 
 
4. 4. 3. Institutions: The Shift in Dual Governance 
 
In the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki Presidential Summit, Turkey was set on the 
path of becoming a member of the European Union. As envisaged by the 
Copenhagen Criteria Turkey had a wide variety of issues it needed to address. 
Democratization of Turkey was seen as an imperative. The EU wanted Turkey to 
fulfill the expectations of the Copenhagen Criteria which required, among other 
things, a genuine civilianization of Turkey’s politics (Çelenk, 2009: 128). With this 
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conviction, numerous institutional legal reforms (or Harmonization Packages) were 
made to democratize the country and strengthen Turkey’s bid for EU membership. 
The early years of the decade did not at first witness a decline in the 
military’s influence. The election of an Islamic-oriented party called into question 
the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. The military was skeptical about the 
AKP as it was a successor of the formerly disbanded Welfare Party. At a party 
conference in 2001, ANAP (Motherland Party) leader Mesut Yılmaz pointed to a 
‘national security syndrome’ and called for greater civilian participation in security 
affairs (Çelenk, 2009: 125). This was summarily dismissed by the military. 
However, EU conditionality provided more impetus for civilianization. The first step 
in civilianizing Turkey’s foreign and security policy came in 2001 when the Ecevit 
government amended Article 118 of the Constitution (Amended on March 19 2001 
by Decree no: 4709/32). Where the Council of Ministers once had to give “priority 
consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council,” now: 
The National Security Council shall submit its advisory decisions 
about the formulation, determination and implementation of the 
national security policy of the State and its opinions about the 
maintenance of the necessary coordination, to the Council of Ministers. 
The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the National 
Security Council concerning the measures it deems necessary for the 
preservation of the existence and independence of the State, integrity 
of the country and peace and security of the society. 
Although well received, skeptics continued to argue that the power of the 
NSC had not been curbed. Nevertheless, at least on paper, elected governments now 
stepped up and the military became the junior partner. 2001 witnessed a severe 
economic crisis and the following year the AKP emerged as the clear winner of the 
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November elections.  They too prioritized accession talks and believed in the 
importance of Turkey’s membership to the EU. 
With this conviction in mind in July 2003 the government introduced the 
Seventh EU Harmonization Package with the aim of reducing the influence of the 
Turkish military. These reforms included parliamentary oversight in the approval of 
the military’s budget2, promoting transparency in government and, perhaps most 
significantly, changes in the NSC. Throughout the year various amendments were 
made.  In January 2003, the composition of the NSC was extended to include more 
civilian members and to relevant officials who could be invited depending on the 
agenda. In August Article 4 of the Law of the NSC, which delineates the duties of 
the Council, was amended to reflect the now advisory nature of the Council as 
envisaged by the amended Article 118 of the Constitution. Article 5 now called for 
bimonthly meetings and the NSC would now convene at the behest of the President 
or Prime Minister, while the Chief of Staff can no longer do so (Law of the National 
Security Council Article 5).      
Another important amendment is the removal of Article 9 which stated that 
the NSC had the right to submit to the President or Prime Minister enquiries 
regarding the execution of measures and policies recommended by the NSC. With 
this important change, Turkish governments are no longer accountable to the NSC. 
Under Article 13, the NSC once enjoyed the right to administer, coordinate, and 
oversee a wide variety of governmental discharges such as national security policies, 
management of the defense industry, and allocation of funds to matters pertaining to 
                                                 
2
 Interestingly, there has been a notable decline in Turkey’s defense spending since then. A decrease 
from 3.2% in 2000 to a 1.8% in 2009 according to CIDOB International Yearbook 2011. 
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the NSC. As of July 2003, Article 13 now states that the NSC is now responsible 
only for its own “secretariat services [and] the duties given by… the relevant laws” 
(Law of National Security Council Article 13). Furthermore, the Secretary General 
is now appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, 
but “the positive opinion of the Chief of Staff is to be sought in case a member of 
the Turkish Armed Forces is to be appointed to this post” (Law of National Security 
Council Article 13). That is to say, the appointment process no longer begins with 
the Chief of Staff and neither are candidates restricted to the top-brass. In 2004, a 
former diplomat, Yiğit Alpdogan, was appointed as the Secretary General of the 
NSC. Finally, Article 19 pertaining to Documents and Information was repealed. 
This means that Ministries and other public offices are no longer required to disclose 
information and classified documents at the behest of the NSC. Finally, the NSC’s 
funds and other military expenditure are now under the scrutiny of the Court of 
Accounts (Çağaptay, 2003).  
The government and society have chipped away at some of the sources from 
which the military derives its power. These include Article 145 of the, the 
EMASYA (Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma – Security, Public Order and Assistance 
Units) Protocol, and Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of the TAF (Şafak, 
2011). Little is known about the EMASYA Protocol other than that it appeared on 
July 7th 1997, at the height of the military’s influence in Turkish politics, and that it 
authorized the TAF to intervene in Turkish social incidents when it deemed 
necessary (NTVMSNBC, February 4 2011). This was no doubt a reaction to the 
aforementioned events that took place in Sincan the same year. EMASYA was 
repealed in February 2010. Article 145 of the Constitution pertains to military 
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justice and the power of military courts. The government is looking to prevent the 
prosecution of civilians in military courts and allow civilian courts to handle military 
cases. Though no measures have yet materialized, the encouraging results of the 
2010 referendum has opened the way for future reforms. Finally, Article 35 of the 
Internal Service Law of the TAF states that the military is entrusted to protect the 
Turkish state and constitution. The document is open-ended and “authorizes the 
TAF to intervene in politics ex-officio to protect the constitutional regime whenever 
it deems necessary (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011: 260). Changes to this article are on the 
agenda; if not a complete overhaul of the entire Service Law.     
One must further look into the National Security Documents of Turkey. 
Although little is known about the documents, they are said to contain plans 
regarding Turkey’s security including action plans against hostile countries. The 
2005 version of the document downgraded threats and did not contain specific 
action plans against neighboring countries (Özcan, 2010: 30). The government is 
said to have influenced the creation of this document. The changes made to the 2010 
version of the document has completely removed irtica from its list of threats (CNN, 
November 22 2010; Yavuz, December 23 2010). Government spokesman Cemil 
Çiçek explained that “the text [of the document] could not contain concepts 
indefinable by law,” because “it damages the [efficacy] of the National Security 
Policy... people accuse each other without any basis” (Çiçek, 2010). In addition to 
downplaying Greece, Iran and Russia as vital threats, the new document identifies 
cyber terrorism, environmental degradation and an ageing population as threats. It 
also opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. For our 
purposes, the most remarkable amendment is that Israel’s actions that cause 
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instability in the Middle East are considered as threats! (Yavuz, December 23 
2010).  
These developments were largely enabled by the military’s own attitudes. It 
is possible to speak of a division within the Turkish Armed Forces as well (Aydınlı, 
2009: 587-588). This division largely relates to how the Turkish modernization, 
Atatürk’s vision, is to be achieved. The ‘conservative camp’ embodies the 
suspiciousness of the old cold warriors. For this group, EU reforms and 
democratization could be the proverbial Pandora’s Box that puts the existence of the 
Turkish state and the secular, republican, order at risk. The ‘progressives’ on the 
other hand share the circumspect of the conservatives but are more willing to let 
history run its course. The latter group came to the fore in the form of Chief of Staff 
Hilmi Özkök (2002-2006), to the chagrin of some of his more conservative peers 
(Aydınlı, 2009: 590). Özkök’s successors displayed a similar willingness to 
cooperate. 
However, the relations were not as smooth as suggested. The military and 
government clashed over a wider public debate encompassing the issue of 
secularism.  For our purposes, the most notable clash was the issuing of the e-
memorandum. In early 2007, the Turkish Parliament was engaged in electing a new 
president to succeed President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. The composition of the Grand 
National Assembly meant that an AKP member would be elected. In April, an e-
memorandum was published on the TAF website at the behest of Chief of Staff 
Yaşar Büyükanıt. The message raised concerns over secularism and that the TAF 
would continue to protect the secular nature of the Republic – a thinly veiled threat 
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against presidential candidates with veiled wives. Needlessly to say, this move was 
not well received by the public, of which more will be said below. The affair 
resulted in the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as President. The AKP 
called for a snap election and achieved yet another slide victory the following 
month.  Clearly, the once all-powerful army could not prevent the election of an 
undesirable candidate. 
The next confrontation took place in 2008 at the Constitutional Court. The 
AKP was tried for becoming a focal point for anti-secular activities and the party 
was threatened with closure – something which was commonplace in Turkey.  
While the Court confirmed that AKP was indeed a focal point for anti-secular 
activities, the party was merely given a fine – the equivalent of a “yellow card” 
(Wrigley, August 1 2008).  
In the same summer, the ‘Ergenekon’ case featured ex-military officials and 
various public figures as part of a clandestine terrorist organization aiming to 
remove the AKP from power. A similarly case began in January 2010 when 
journalists revealed documents and information about a coup plot dating back to 
March 2003.  The ‘Sledgehammer’ case now includes 196 suspects. Nevertheless, 
the military has time and again demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the 
judiciary and government.  
The summer of 2011 also proved to be eventful for Turkey’s civil-military 
relations. The declining influence of the military and the pending cases against some 
members of the TAF alleged to have participated in criminal activities manifested in 
symbolic gestures signaling the end of an era. On July 30th 2011, the Chief of 
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General Staff along with other members of the top-brass asked for retirement. It was 
done to protest the inability of the TAF to “protect the rights of the generals accused 
of involvement in the Sledgehammer plot” (Alpay, May 9 2011). A week later the 
Supreme Military Council, which deliberates on such issues as military 
preparedness, the appointment of higher echelon commanders, and disciplinary 
concerns regarding TAF personnel, convened in one of its biannual sessions. 
Traditionally, the sessions are presided over by the Prime Minister and Chief of 
General Staff, who sit side by side at the head of the conference table, flanked by the 
various force commanders. This session featured the Prime Minister, and the Prime 
Minister alone, at the head of the table. In a similar disposition, a mixed seating 
arrangement came into being in the NSC. The Prime Minister made the necessary 
decisions to appoint a new set of force commanders and appointed Işık Koşaner as 
his Chief of Staff. Although these are symbolic gestures, they were received in the 
public as yet more evidence for the changing balances within Turkish politics. 
More recently, İlker Başbuğ and Yaşar Büyükanıt are now charged with 
having conspired against the government and committed acts of terrorism because of 
the e-memorandum issued by the TAF in 2007. Charges were also brought against 
former General and President Kenan Evren who had carried out the 1980 coup. 
These developments, once unthinkable in Turkey, now show the extent to which the 
domestic balance of power has shifted.    
4. 4. 4. Civil Society 
 
The rise of Turkey’s civil society continued in the AKP as major economic actors as 
well as social organizations now found greater space to operate in (Duran & 
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Yıldırım, 2005: 67; Burak, 2011: 67). In some cases, Turkish civil society exerted a 
decisive influence in determining Turkish foreign policy (Rumelili, 2005). More 
importantly, as mentioned earlier, Turkey’s foreign policy under the AKP 
emphasizes economic and trade relations, often utilizing soft power (Kirişçi, 2009).  
The emphasis on trade relations suggests internal changes within Turkey. 
Indeed, a variety of businesses and business associations, by aligning themselves 
with the AKP government, were able to encourage Turkey’s economic activism in 
the Middle East. Tür (2011) builds on the arguments of Wright Mills and suggests 
that “business influence over government came not through distant lobbying but 
through a shared world view, informal personal networks and overlapping roles” 
(Tür, 2011: 591). The rising devout bourgeoisie of Anatolia have identified 
themselves with the AKP. Moreover, business associations like MÜSIAD and the 
more recently established TUSKON (Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists 
Association) enjoy a privileged partnership with the government (Tür, 2011: 592). 
Among others, the government and business associations have hosted a number of 
different economic conferences such as the Levant Business Forum and the Middle 
East Trade Bridge. Much of these developments collaborate the structural arguments 
pointing towards Turkey’s business interests in Arab countries. However, Turkish 
Israeli trade relations have also continued to increase despite minor setbacks (Tür, 
2011: 594). This suggests that even identity-economic based arguments may not 
sufficiently account for the decline of the alliance.   
As Öniş (2011) notes, civil society participation in policy making has 
increased along with their influence in foreign policy. As for other actors in Turkish 
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society, the simple matter is that civil society can get behind their parties and 
influence policy. Not only was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s outburst at 
Davos widely applauded, but Israel became an issue contested in Turkey’s elections 
(Kosebalaban, 2010: 50, 42). In fact, on certain occasions, opposition parties 
displayed a more vituperative rhetoric against Israel and condemned the AKP for 
being too lenient! (Kosebalaban, 2010: 51). Contrast this with the 1990s, specifically 
the Sincan Incident, when the Turkish military intervened to silence anti-Israeli, 
religious, demonstrators.  
Think-tanks also articulate their views on foreign policy matters. Often said 
to have close ties to the AKP government, SETA (Foundation for Economic, 
Political, and Social Research) is a notable example of a think-tank actively 
involved in shaping Turkish foreign policy. The think tank’s line of thinking is 
remarkably consistent with that of the government in that it promotes Turkey’s 
activism in the region as well as closer ties in the neighborhood (Aras, 2009).  There 
are remarkably pertinent observations in some reports: 
Since the early 2000’s, Turkey’s newly adopted vision for the Middle 
East, which targets political stability and economic integration in the 
region, started to openly clash with Israeli vision of the region that is 
characterized by isolation, fragmentation, and the sacrifice of 
international law for security concerns. In other words, clashing visions 
for the region have put the two countries in a position where diplomatic 
crises are almost unavoidable. The latest flotilla attack or the chair crisis 
are merely the tip of the iceberg and are reflective of the two states’ 
divergent regional outlook and understanding of a lasting peace. (Ulutaş, 
2010: 10) 
 
While the critical observer may point out that the statement appears to be supporting 
an elite agenda, for our purposes it is sufficient to note that it corroborates the 
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argument presented in this research. The statement draws attention to “Turkey’s 
newly adopted vision for the Middle East” and attributes the decline of the alliance 
to clashing visions (Ulutaş, 2010: 10). Israel is also criticized for its aggression and 
short-sightedness (Ulutaş, 2011; Yılmaz, 2010; Bölme, 2009.). 
It would also seem that civil-society actors have also assumed the role of 
carrying out policy on their own. For example, the breaking-point in the Turkish-
Israeli alliance was instigated by civilian activists. The IHH’s (The Foundation for 
Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) desire to help Gazans set the 
stage for the Mavi Marmara incident in May 30 2010.  
 
 
4. 5. The National Interest since 2002 
 
The previous three sections demonstrated the decline of the military's influence in 
politics. Rather than a continuous succession of different political leaders and 
unstable rainbow coalitions, a single party could set the agenda and pursue 
consistently its own policies.  Furthermore, electoral success is conducive to greater 
confidence in political leaders and we have seen that the AKP challenged the 
Turkish Armed Forces whilst appealing to their democratic mandate and the will of 
the people. The military used to be the most respected and reliable institution, it 
would seem that the AKP, or the government, became a viable alternative (Aydınlı, 
2009: 581-582). In the process of change within Turkey’s domestic structure, the 
conflict between the centralizing state elite and the decentralizing government elite, 
the latter now seem to hold the upper hand. The declining power of the elite has 
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been compounded by institutional and legal changes induced by globalization. The 
new elites have articulated a different national agenda.  
Perhaps it has to do with the personal convictions of an elite group that has 
embraced conservative values and are therefore hostile to Israeli policies. Despite 
severing ties with more traditionalist elements of the Welfare Party and maintaining 
a moderate stance towards Israel until 2008, one can still question legitimately 
question the sincerity of the new elite. Perhaps Turkey's attitude is simply a means 
to promote Turkey’s cultural and economic ties in a neighborhood that happens to 
be hostile to Israel. Opposition party leader Kılıçdaroğlu  (Milliyet, 2011) accused 
Erdoğan of "conducting populism on Arab Street." Articles published in the 
Economist have also pointed to Erdoğan's unbecoming populism (Economist, 2011).  
Yet, the theatrical nature of the exchanges suggests that it may well be a 
domestically motivated move. Although Yanık (2012: 224) argues that Turkish 
voters are primarily concerned with economic issues and that foreign policy is often 
a triviality, or a non-issue, the role of foreign policy cannot be ignored. The reason is 
that foreign policy is a means for political parties to articulate their weltenschaaung, 
including their vision for what Turkey was, is and could be in the future. For 
example, voters might be attracted by the promise of becoming a "leader country" 
(Yanık, 2012: 224) and playing an active role in the region.  
Given that the Turkish-Israeli alliance never enjoyed a broad societal 
approval, rejecting Israel could yield political benefits. As indicated earlier, in the 
aftermath of the Davos Summit the Turkish public approved the hostile rhetoric 
against Israel; in fact, the opposition parties criticized the government for being 
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lenient on Israel vis-à-vis its policies towards Gaza (Oğuzlu, 2009). Moreover, 
Erdoğan was not only given a hero's welcome upon his return from the Davos 
Summit in 2009, but the subject of Israel and Palestine appeared as a topic during 
his speeches in the 2011 electoral campaign. More importantly, Erdoğan tended to 
infer a relationship between the main opposition party, CHP, which one could argue 
still supports the interests of the old elite, and Israel. These excerpts from some of 
Erdoğan's speeches during the 2011 election campaign should prove interesting. In 
his election speech at Adana (Erdoğan, 2011a): 
We used to think that the CHP Chairman was the project of 
nationalists and gang-members. As it turns out, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu is 
also a project of international gang-members. The Chairman of the 
CHP, who sends his regards to Israel, to Tel Aviv at every opportunity, 
is now being rewarded.
3
 What does he say? "If it were up to us, we 
would not have sent the Mavi Marmara. If we were in charge we 
would have prevented the deterioration of relations with Israel. It 
would seem that the CHP Chairman succeeded in wining the favor of 
someone. This is the underlying cause of the Economist's article. He 
should not bring up the Mavi Marmara for the memory of all those 
innocent babies killed in Gaza, Jerusalem and Ramallah by 
phosphorous bombs; they were taking food to the babies in Gaza. Mavi 
Marmara was bringing toys to children in the Gaza. No person with 
compassion in his heart would dare criticize the Mavi Marmara. If he 
[Kılıçdaroğlu] has any courage, any honor, he should criticize piracy in 
the Mediterranean instead of ingratiating himself to Israel.   
 
In a swoop, Erdoğan trancended any borders that may have existed 
between domestic and foreign affairs. His speech at the Adıyaman electoral 
meeting is also noteworthy. In reference to the Mavi Marmara incident, Erdoğan 
(2011c): 
                                                 
3
 In reference to an article published in the Economist that encouraged Turkish 
voters to vote for CHP 
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We have underlined and expressed our position from the very 
beginning. First; we said the Israeli Government must apologize. 
Second; the families [of the deceased] must be compensated. Three; 
the blockade on Gaza will be removed. As long as our conditions 
are not met, our attitude towards the Israeli Government will never 
change. Of course, interesting events are taking place these days. 
The CHP Chairman, as you know, is doing everything he can to 
appear sympathetic to Israel. What does he say? "If it was up to me, 
I would not have sent the Mavi Marmara," he says. Are you mad? 
You cannot hinder any ship passing by on international waters. You 
search for documents; inform them if they are missing ones; and 
then ask them to turn back - it's as simple as that. You cannot 
prevent the free innocent passage of ships in any other way. "If it 
was me", he says, "I would not have allowed relations to go bad 
with Israel." He's right, that's right. Because, as you know, CHP is 
the first to recognize Israel as a state. But these people [CHP and, in 
a sense, the old elite] have humbled themselves in front of Hitler. 
You can't tell where and what they will do. But these efforts to 
flatter Israel have not gone unnoticed. Do you know what some 
international media institutions, many of which are funded by 
Jewish money, recently and, in an unprecedented manner, said? 
They have made their intentions known by telling people to vote for 
the CHP.    
The same rhetoric is present in Erdoğan’s (2011b) speech at the Çankırı 
meeting. It implies that CHP is opportunistic, without principle and pro-Israeli 
(which is something to be deplored).   
Dear brothers, look, the Main Opposition Party Chairman says: 
"these guys don't really have any vision in international politics." He 
says, "if it was up to me, I would have prevented the Mavi Marmara 
from taking on this voyage, I would not have allowed it. If I was in 
charge, I would not have allowed relations with Israel to decline." 
Dear brothers, we know all about their way of politics. Mr. 
Kılıçdaroğlu's mentality is one that celebrates Hitler's birthday. These 
people [CHP] send delegations to Germany. The same mentality that 
immediately recognizes the foundation of Israel. My dear brothers, 
they don't see the 9 Turks killed on the Mavi Marmara, the children 
killed on strawberry fields in Gaza, they only see Tel-Aviv. This is 
what separates us from them.      
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Thus, there is evidence that in the absence of any military-bureaucratic control 
over foreign policy, civilian politicians exploit foreign policy for domestic ends. The 
incumbent government could afford to and even benefit politically from adopting 
such an unprecedented and severe disposition towards a former ally. Domestically 
unpopular, the Turkish-Israeli partnership, as far as its military-political aspects are 
concerned, did not survive once the military lost power Furthermore, it may have 
been a necessary move to further weaken the military, which had laid the 
foundations for the alliance a decade earlier. Displaying an overtly anti-Israeli 
disposition and elevating crises with Israel was a means of discrediting the military 
establishment of Turkey which would strengthen AKP’s position – a reversal of 
roles since the previous decade. It may be fair to say that the alliance with Israel 
simply did not correspond to the national interest as defined by Turkey’s new elites. 
The next chapter will discuss these findings. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
COMPARATIVE CONCLUSION 
 
 
5. 1. A Review of Findings 
 
It was argued in the introduction to the study that purely structural theories of 
alliances and foreign policy cannot adequately address state behavior in the new 
global conjuncture. The main reason for this was that certain types of states 
responded differently to the pressures for liberalization and decentralization. The 
changes were particularly significant in "torn states" where these pressures 
empowered new elites and led to a bifurcation of the national agenda in which 
security-oriented old elites compete with the diverse agenda of the new elites 
(Aydınlı, 2005). What happens to state behavior when the transformation process 
continues and the new elites are able to shape the agenda, or the national interest, 
without impediment? 
 To find out, Chapter II articulated a comparative, longitudinal, case study 
research design where in the alliance relations of Turkey, a country that underwent 
decentralization and democratization, and Israel were compared over two periods 
(1990s and the AKP period). The comparison was based on the theories and 
propositions found in the literature review and the two periods were contrasted in 
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terms of system level variables such as the distribution of capabilities and threats; 
domestic security threats; and elite and institutional changes.   
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union presented opportunities and 
challenges. On the one hand, Turkey was no longer vulnerable to the threat 
emanating from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Turkey could now exercise a 
multifaceted foreign policy and expand its economic links in the FSU. On the other 
hand, the end of the Cold War, as it was argued,  also diminished the strategic 
importance of Turkey. For example, the ebb of Soviet power in the Middle East may 
have meant that US aid to its allies in the region might also diminish to the effect 
that Turkey and Israel had to combine forces to compensate for this (Picolli, 1999: 
73-74). Neorealists would suggest an assessment of the relative distribution of 
capabilities. Examination revealed that the distribution of capabilities among Turkey 
and its neighbors have more or less remained static in the post-Cold War period. In 
fact, at roughly 1.5% of world capabilities Turkey's capabilities were mightier than 
its neighbors.  
 Turkey's decision-makers were concerned about Turkey's neighbors. 
However, the nature of the threats were exacerbated because of their implication for 
the domestic security problems of Turkey. For example, relations with Iraq and 
Syria had implications for Turkey's PKK problem and the Islamist Iranian regime 
was thought to be aiding Islamist elements within Turkey.  
 None of this come as a surprise given the domestic politics of Turkey at the 
time. Turkey was beginning to feel the decentralizing effects of globalization as new 
elites were emerging. Yet, the traditional, security-oriented, elite were in control. It 
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was found that the Turkish military intervened in foreign and domestic policy on 
multiple occasions. Turkey's partnership with Israel was forged under the auspices 
of the military and at a time when the elected government was avowedly anti-Israeli. 
So disturbing was the government and its association with Islam that the state elite 
successfully brought about the downfall of the REFAHYOL government. We see 
that Turkey's national interest was dominated by the preferences of the statist elite 
who prioritized secularism. In short, it appears that there are justifiable traditional 
explanations for Turkey's foreign policy n the 1990s.  However, chapter III raises an 
interesting point: if the alliance was not solely forged by system level factors, then 
could it not mean that Turkey's decision to ally with Israel was a form of 
maladaptive behavior in the first place?  The implication is that there is nothing 
significant about the decline of the alliance. This is not the case though. There are 
sufficient justifiable reasons for the alliance such as common external threats (Iran, 
Syria) and a desire for internal balancing (against PKK and Islamists); all of which 
can be explained by traditional theories. Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy was 
still consistent and Western-oriented.  
 Chapter IV analyzed the AKP period under the same headings. As far as 
power, material capabilities, and power aggregation are concerned, available data 
(until 2007) from the Composite Index of National Capabilities database does not 
suggest any reasons for why the Turkish-Israeli partnership would collapse. After a 
period of decline with the financial crisis of 2001, Turkey's share in world 
capabilities began to improve, while Iraq's capabilities after the US-led invasion in 
2003 reached its nadir. One notable feature of the distribution of capabilities is the 
meteoric rise of Iranian capabilities. It would seem that the growth in Iranian power 
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was a not a sufficient condition for continued Turkish-Israeli cooperation. If 
anything, a Turkish-Israeli alliance would have made even more sense today than it 
did in the 1990s. All of this suggests that a purely capability based approach cannot 
explain the decline of the Turkish-Israeli alliance. 
 Regarding structural and internal threats Turkey, at least for a time, stopped 
perceiving Iran and Syria as threats (Aras & Polat, 2008).  Evidence suggests that 
this is the product of changing attitudes within Turkey as desecuritization of political 
Islam and, to an extent, the Kurdish issue; in addition to economic interests, have 
improved Turkish-Iranian relations. Furthermore, PKK terrorism remains a potent 
force affecting Turkey.  By the end of the 1990s, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan was caught. At the high tide of the military’s power, the PKK had ceased its 
activities. In practice, actual structural pressures, the distribution of capabilities, the 
attributes of the Iranian and Syrian regimes remain the same. Similarly, domestic 
threats like the PKK continue to be a potent problem for Turkey. In fact the PKK 
came back with a vengeance during the AKP period. One implication for the revival, 
or continuation, of PKK terrorism was that their persistence suggested that a purely 
hard security based approach was not sufficient to tackle the issue (Özcan, 2010). 
This prompted the government to take charge of the affair. Aside from cooperation 
by NGOs, the much vaunted ‘Democratic Opening’ was initiated under the auspices 
of the AKP government even though PKK terrorism is still deemed to be the biggest 
threat to Turkey according to the National Security Document. In light of the 
persistence of such a security problem it is difficult to imagine that the Turkish-
Israeli alliance would end. Granted, the PKK was of peripheral interest in their 
bilateral relations. Far more interesting is the matter of “irtica” or religious 
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fundamentalists and aspiring political Islamist groups. According to the National 
Security Documents of the previous decade, specifically the 1997 version, these 
groups were deemed as threats to the survival of the Turkish state along with 
ideological extremists from both sides of the political spectrum (Çelenk, 2009: 120). 
This is no longer the case as religious threats have increasingly been deemphasized 
in succeeding NSC Red Books (most notably in the 2010 version. Recalling from 
the previous chapter that a major reason for the Turkish-Alliance was the secular 
establishment’s desire to “balance” the rising tide of religious fundamentalism 
(Yavuz, 1997; Altunışık & Martin, 2011), it can be inferred that the de-emphasis of 
religious groups as a threat would lower the utility of Israel as an ally against a 
domestic threat. However, such a change can only be explained through a change in 
the secular establishment or the weakening of its main components, such as the 
military.  
 Table 4. Assessment of Variables 
 
 What is different about Turkey in the AKP period, and may account for the 
decline of the Turkish-Israeli alliance, is the transformation of the dual governance 
Level of Analysis Variable 90s AKP Period 
System-Level Distribution of Capabilities Favors Turkey 
No significant 
change 
 Neighbors 
Nature of 
regimes and 
PKK problem 
No significant 
change 
State/society-Level PKK Terrorism Ever-present 
No significant 
change 
 Dual governance structure  
State elites and 
military shape 
policy 
New elites 
shape policy 
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structure. Turkey’s statist elite engaged in securitization throughout the 1990s to 
justify the military’s interference in Turkey’s then fragmented political system. A 
decade later Turkey now had a stable single party government. Moreover ongoing 
institutional changes since 2001 not only reduced the interference of the military in 
foreign policy but also enabled greater ‘civilian’ participation in policy-making. 
Furthermore, the inter-elite conflict between the statists and AKP elite undermined 
the credibility of the military. In 2008, after the old-elite failed to ban the AKP from 
politics, charges were brought against a broad range of people including high-
ranking military officials and journalists for terrorism and conspiring against the 
government. Under these conditions, free of any balancing by the military, Turkey’s 
new elite, established firm control over foreign policy. 
 It is at this point that Turkish-Israeli began a downward spiral. Turkey's new 
national interest, as articulated by the prime minister, the government, and pro-
government organizations in civil society, the press and think tanks, reflected the 
tenets of Ahmet Davutoğlu's book. It emphasizes history and culture, and advocates 
closer relations with the Middle East. Most importantly, Turkey is portrayed as a 
pivotal country that can and should become a regional leader involved in the issues 
of its neighborhood. Contrast this with Turkey's lukewarm attitude to the region in 
the past. These principles manifested in Turkey's national interest and foreign 
policy. Specifically, the vaunted zero-problems policy with neighbors aimed to 
improve Turkey's bilateral relations with its neighborhood so that it may increase its 
diplomatic leverage in the region.   
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 Where does the decline of the alliance fit into in this new arrangement? 
Israel's transition from a close partner to a "terrorist state" can be attributed to 
multiple causes including "objective" reasons such practical policy concerns and the 
world views of the new elite; and "subjective" reasons such as a  desire to discredit 
the statist elites, or simply to garner more votes, all of which would benefit the new 
elite consolidate its power. It would have been necessary to express greater concern 
towards Israel's policies towards Palestinians if the AKP were to enhance Turkey's 
image in a region where the AKP wanted Turkey to play an active role. 
Furthermore, as we saw in chapters III and IV, Turkey's conservative elites have 
inherited an intellectual tradition that is less sympathetic to Israel and, therefore, it is 
not in the interest of Turkey to continue pursuing such close military and diplomatic 
relations with Israel. Chapter IV highlighted important subjective causes. From the 
aftermath of the Davos Summit in 2009 to the run up to the 2011 general election, 
Israel became a domestic issue. Erdoğan's outburst at Davos was a very popular 
move domestically and hostile rhetoric continued throughout the following crises. In 
some of his 2011 election campaign speeches, Erdoğan formed an association 
between his main rival in CHP with Israel.  
 Theoretically, what are the implications of these findings? Purely structural 
alliance theories are insufficient in addressing the transforming states in the 
developing world.  Although it was established that third world states may base 
policies on domestic security concerns (Singer, 1987; Barnett, Levy, 1991), the 
impact of democratization and decentralization have not been studied. In this 
respect, as we have seen in Turkey, democratization and decentralization may 
exacerbate elite power struggles in torn states. Emerging actors will pursue policies 
  
 
117 
 
based on their world vision or whatever is deemed practical. They may even attempt 
to “hijack” the state and pursue policies aimed at consolidating power. As we have 
seen in Snyder (1991) and Lee (2007a; 2007b), emerging elites often present 
alternative visions in foreign policy - whether these new visions lead to consistent 
and stable foreign policy is an altogether different matter. 
 The shift in the dual governance structure allows new elites to consolidate 
power and exercise their power without the restraining effects of opposing societal 
groups. They are able to formulate policies that they believe may benefit the 
country, or themselves. They can desecuritize old threats (for example, political 
Islam) or securitize new ones (for example, secular elites who have a penchant for 
coups). They can articulate a new course in foreign policy and pursue it without 
constrains from other societal forces (the military, for example). Thus:  
The rise of new elites ==> Reformulation of the national interest 
X 
decline in the power of old elite 
 
  
 In Turkey's case, the new elites were initially constrained by the residual 
power of the old elites. However, institutional changes as well as the course of 
domestic transformation, the discrediting of the old elite, have enabled the new elites 
to consolidate more power. It comes as no surprise that the real decline of the 
alliance coincides with the period soon after the 2007 elections and the coup 
allegations raised against military officials.  
 A new foreign policy vision envisioned the application of soft power, 
emphasized historical and cultural links in addition to economic ones, and advocated 
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a leadership role for Turkey in its neighborhood. Certain external threats were 
deemphasized and relations improved with Iran and Syria. A change in Turkey's 
elites precipitated a change in external threat perception. While Israel considers Iran 
an existential threat, Turkish-Iranian relations were improving (Aras & Karakaya, 
2007).  Furthermore, the total fulfillment of Turkey's regional leadership aspirations 
would necessitate an involvement in Israeli- Palestinian affairs; something which 
previous Turkish governments avoided. Furthermore, a confrontation with Israel 
would be beneficial as the countries which the AKP wished to impress considered 
Israel as a major antagonist. Although any Turkish government would have reacted 
to the IDF's operations in Gaza, the vitriol against the Israeli government suggests 
something more ominous. If the goal of the AKP was to improve Israel's behavior 
towards Gazans and to assuage the living standards in Gaza, then antagonizing 
relations with Israel is counterintuitive. On the other hand, tirades against Israel 
seem to provoke positive reactions domestically and from countries in the region. 
Hence the excerpts from Erdoğan's electoral speeches levied criticism against both 
Israel and to the main opposition party (CHP) which displayed a more conciliatory 
approach to Israel.     
 Before we conclude the thesis, however, it may be appropriate to consider 
several alternative approaches that can be utilized in the future for this type of 
research. 
 
 
5. 2. Future research: Possible Hypotheses 
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Bearing in mind the unique circumstances of torn states and the inability of 
traditional structural theories in illuminating state behavior in a globalizing world, 
further research is needed to test possible new hypotheses on a wider range of 
countries and time periods to increase generalizability.  
 Furthermore future research utilizing neoclassical realism, which has thus far 
provided the most comprehensive solutions to the problem of explaining 
maladaptive behavior, may benefit from analyzing a wider variety of variables. 
Specifically, “globalization” or “global pressures” could be conceptualized another 
system-level parameter for decision-makers to navigate. Contrast H1 with H2 
below:  
H1: Typical neoclassical realist hypothesis 
System-level factors (relative distribution of capabilities)  unit-level (state extractive capacity: elite 
consensus, social cohesion etc.)  Balancing  
H2: A possible theory  
Globalization Conflictive domestic transformation  maladaptive FP behavior 
 Realists usually take anarchy, that is to say the relative distribution of 
capabilities, geographic proximity and offense-defense balance as the starting point 
of their research. Since neoclassical realists view the international system and 
domestic politics as two different constraints on the ability of decision-makers to 
execute policy, it may not be so farfetched to suggest the impact of globalization, 
that is to say, decentralization, liberalization, democratization. While some may 
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criticize such endeavors,
4
 it may be necessary. H3 is a different version of the 
current research. Such a research would explicitly study the effects of such pressures 
as EU conditionality, economic trends and world public opinion on Turkey’s weary 
elites who were simultaneously waging a domestic battle to maintain their position. 
Such a study would however have to demarcate the extent to which the independent 
variable and intervening variable are independent of each other.      
H3: A different version of this study 
Structural Pressures  Democratization & decentralization  Alliance with Israel no longer in the 
        interest of Turkey  
 
 
5. 3. Concluding Remarks 
 
This research has reviewed theories relating to alliances, foreign policy, and 
democratization. Of course the findings of this research are not generalizable, 
however, it makes a modest contribution to the literature on democratization and 
alliance behavior. Moreover, in addition to providing an analysis of the Turkish-
Israeli alliance, the research identified causal mechanisms pertaining to 
democratization and alliance behavior. Political democratization empowers new 
elites and actors while upsetting the traditional balance of power in domestic 
politics. These new groups shape the national interest in manner that suits them, 
meaning that a state’s foreign relations may not only be conducted on the basis of 
                                                 
4
 For example, Legro-Moravschik have criticized neoclassical realists for using state-level variables 
as intervening variable. Brian Rathbun, on the other hand, argues that no paradigm can monopolize a 
variable and there is nothing wrong with such endeavors provided that the theory remains consistent 
and “makes the variable its own.” 
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new preferences that may be difficult to gauge – foreign policy may be utilized to 
achieve domestic ends. In any case, the different preferences may manifest 
themselves as different policies. For example, Turkey’s statist elite securitized 
political Islam and relations with Iran and Syria. The new conservative elite also 
engages in securitization but it is directed against secularists and Alevis in domestic 
politics and against Israel in foreign policy. Perhaps the essence of human behavior 
and, consequently, human communities may persist, but preferences and priorities 
are likely to vary across different periods. The conclusion we can draw from this 
study is therefore: 
 
Decentralization/democratization  Unpredictability in alliance behavior. 
 
  
 Are there other implications for international relations? Of course it is not 
possible to generalize these findings on a wider scale before more studies are 
conducted. However, findings here suggest that new elites, once firmly in control, 
will likely propagate a national interest more in line with their concerns. Alliances or 
foreign policy orientations advocated by old elites are likely to be replaced. It is not 
possible to know whether their agenda will be practical and consistent with 
conventional state behavior. It will be difficult predicting and counteracting the 
behavior of such states. Identity politics, domestic politics or sectarian concerns may 
become more salient in the conduct of state relations More importantly states that 
are likely to undergo such transformations have grassroots movements that are 
averse to the West. If these elements are able to decisively shape foreign policy, we 
are headed towards a more uncertain international system. The effects of 
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globalization may be exacerbating international anarchy! Not unlike the propositions 
pertaining to neomedievalism, there is perhaps a reason to think: 
Globalization  More anarchy? 
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